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Cryptography has been the culmination of human trials and mistrials in an attempt to
keep information safe from unintended access. We have learned from our mistakes in
the past, and today with the help of both academician and software developers, we have
robust cryptographic technologies. Cryptography however, is a race between increasing
processing power of modern machines and the complexity of cryptographic systems.
With quantum computing on the horizon, our present cryptographic systems seem to fall
behind in this race. There is a need to catalyze research in the field.
Here, an application is proposed, which empowers users to write their own cryptographic
schemes. It hopes to create a platform where people can share their cryptographic
schemes and have an application that can help them share information securely. The
author hopes, that an application which sources cryptographic schemes from users, would
help catalyze research in the field. An application where the security implementation
is dependent on the whim of the user could prove a hard target for attack. The thesis
starts with a preliminary study of the Android platform. The thesis then analyzes im-
plementations of a few secure messaging applications and then delves into details of NFC.
Using the background information accumulated during the course of this study, the
authors attempt to formulate a sound implementation of a messaging application. The
thesis is also accompanied with a proof-of-concept Android application that checks the
viability of concepts discussed herein.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Any kind of change, that has ever brought about a major shift in the human way of liv-
ing, has always been accompanied with a change in the way we communicate. Be it the
great industrial revolution, the sociopolitical changes in the early 20th century, the Cold
war or the advent of information age at the end of 20th century. Communication and its
advancements have always played a vital role in human history.
The inherent power of information has motivated people to come up with ways to keep
certain kinds of information hidden in transit. To keep secrecy, we have come up with a
number of ingenious methods to scramble information for everyone except the intended
receiver of the message. Depending on the importance of hidden information, there have
also been people who have attempted to gain unauthorized knowledge of this information.
This constant game of cat and mouse, between the information scramblers and informa-
tion deciphers led to the advent of the field of cryptanalysis.
With the dawn of information age, we have faster communication channels. We have
communication channels that use different types of transport medium to transmit data.
Information itself is no more just text. Information can now be in the form of voice,
video or text. The mode of access to information too has many varied end points of con-
sumption. This complexity in information, introduced by the information age prompted
formation of governing bodies that would advise people and organizations of ways to se-
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cure one’s data.
However, the growing complexity of these systems makes it difficult to understand the
underlying concepts of these systems. This thesis tries to bridge this gap by proposing an
application which can be used by people with rudimentary programming skills to write
their own simple cryptographic schemes. This would allow them to encrypt their SMS
messages between their Android devices using their own encryption schemes. It hopes
to create a platform where people can share their cryptographic schemes and ideas and
possibly lead to better insight in the field of cryptanalysis.
As the work here is based on the Android platform, the thesis starts with an introduction
to the Android security platform. It then cover the basic concepts of cryptography and fol-
low this with an overview of some successful mobile messaging applications. The thesis
then proposes a secure messaging application with a walk through of a proof of concept
Android application.
Chapter 2
Android Security Architecture
This section covers Android architecture from a security perspective. Android’s security
architecture builds on well known Linux security features. Keeping this in mind the sec-
tion starts with details of Linux security implementation, which is then followed by new
security features introduced in Android. Finally the section is concluded with a discussion
on SEAndroid which is an extension of SELinux.
2.1 Android system architecture
Android platform was selected for studying the security architecture of modern systems
because of its extensive reach in the market and for its support for NFC. An overview of
the Android Architecture is depicted in Figure-2.1. The figure shows hierarchy of data
access in an Android system. Applications request access to system resources through the
Android framework. The Android framework, in turn requests accesss to the resources
through Native Libraries and Android Runtime. Android Runtime and Native Libraries
can access resources from the Linux Kernel through the Hardware Abstraction Layer
(HAL). Android uses security features available in Linux operating system and adds new
application layer security rules to complete its own security model. What is referred to
as the Linux operating system here is the Linux kernel. To make use of the Linux kernel
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Figure 2.1: Android System Architecture.
in a low form factor device, Android made a few changes in the way linux handled sec-
ondary memory and kernel initialization. The following packages/features are different
in Android [1] [2] [3].
• Yet Another Flash File System (YAFFS2). Android uses YAFFS instead of ext4
file system which it commonly used in Linux. It makes sense as Android is almost
always installed on portable devices with flash storage devices.
• ’The init’ module has been implemented differently in Android. Android does not
follow either POSIX [4] or SystemV [5] standards for initialization of user space.
The kernel initialization is however similar to other Linux distributions. Once the
kernel is initiated, the user space initialization uses the init scripts defined in init
and initrc files (other init scripts are included in the initrc folder). The init ini-
tializer is a compiled ELF executable which among other things, excutes scripts
specified in init.rc. Executable and Linking Format (ELF) is the format to which
binary executable files have to conform to in order to be executable in the Linux
environment. Android uses it’s own initialization language called the Android Init
Language. This language contains 4 types of statements - Actions, Commands,
Services and Options. Actions are statements that would follow a set of commands
CHAPTER 2. ANDROID SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 5
when a trigger in invoked. For example, the ’on init’ action is followed by tab
spaced operations in the following lines. These lines represent the operations that
the systems must perform when it goes through normal initialization. Other actions
are ’on early init’, ’boot’, ’charger’, etc. Vendors of Android devices have the provi-
sion of adding extra actions in case they need to handle device specific peculiarities.
Services are programs (mostly daemons) that would be launched on startup and are
essential for the functioning of the system. Options are parameters that are passed
to the service to tweak its behavior based on system requirements. The init.rc script
contains the default initialization steps on an Android system. Following is what
can be surmised from the file.
– When the system boots, the action with trigger ’on boot’ is initiated. This
initializes the network interface and sets up file system mount points. SELinux
partition is loaded and the the ownership of the partition is set to system. This
is to enable remote update of SELinux policy.
– Control groups are created for mount points and processes. Control groups
called cgroups in short was introduced by Google in 2007, and was later in-
ducted into the mainstream Linux kernel and used in many applications like
Docker, Hadoop, etc. This allows Linux to limit resources to processes, prior-
itize resource share, accounting of resource usage and controlling processes.
Through control groups, both user space and system applications can be lim-
ited to use a certain percentage of CPU time and certain bytes of primary and
secondary memory. This prevents any single user application from consuming
all compute resources and making the device unusable. The init.rc contains
an extensive set of commands for allocating/limiting resources to processes.
– Services are started after completion of control group creation. This is done
using the class start command, which starts services belonging to the specified
classes. All basic service belong to the class core or main.
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– One of the first Android services to be started is the zygote daemon (which
is in-fact just the /system/bin/app process program), this initializes the ART
VM. All the service and process initiated prior to this step pertain to the Linux
system [6]. Once ART VM has started, the Android System Server (ASS) is
initiated. The ASS first initializes the ’android servers’, which provides in-
terfaces to the Linux system services and Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL)
services like Wi-Fi, system clock, battery, telecommunication network ser-
vice, etc. These services are managed by Linux using the Control Groups, Dis-
cretionary Access Control (DAC) and SEAndroid. The interaction between
Linux kernel and Android is accomplished with the help of interfaces defined
by ’android server’. These interfaces are implemented using Java Native In-
terface (JNI). JNI makes communication between system native applications
and ART native applications easier. In Android, JNI provides the Android
system with binders/interfaces to communicate with Linux system services of
Wi-Fi, system clock, etc. Using Binders, ART applications can access system
services. The implementation of binders, replaces the standard Inter Process
Communication (IPC) mechanism in Linux. Binders were implemented to of-
fer secure IPC. Once these service are initialized, the applications specified
in system partition (contacts, messaging application, phone applications and
other default applications) are initiated followed by user installed applications.
2.2 Implementation of security
The following section discusses the components of Android system responsible for its
security. This includes the discussion of Linux DAC, IPC, Segregation of System Appli-
cations, Application signing schemes and SELinux.
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2.2.1 Linux DAC
Android capitalizes on many well proven Linux security features. Linux is a multiuser
system. It performs user and process management using Discretionary Access Control
(DAC) (the study assumes that reader has some knowledge of DAC, though it does cover
it briefly here) [7]. DAC allocates identities to users, processes and groups. User identities
are designated to either individual users or programs. When a process starts
• The process is assigned a number,
• The process’s parent’s (program that spawns it) process ID is noted,
• The user or process that spawned the process is noted.
Groups are identifiers that can be associated with one or more users. User, group and
process ID’s would hence forth be referred to as UID, GID and PID. When an application
attempts to run, the following checks are performed.
• Who is the owner of the file/executable/process? Does the user, trying to invoke the
process, belong to the right group?
• Does the file, have read/write/execute permissions for that particular user (directly
or through a group) ?
A process is executed only if the above rules are satisfied. DAC is called ’discretionary’
as the users who have access to the file have some level of control with regard to sharing
file access. Android uses DAC to assign each installed application with a unique UID
and GID. The application is also assigned a data directory which cannot be accessed by
other applications. Figure 2.2 shows the permissions of a newly installed application.
UID of an application can be obtained from the list of running application by searching
for the application package name that is included in the AndroidManifest.xml file of the
application. AndroidManifest.xml specifies the list of resources the application needs ac-
cess to. The file also specifies the location of application initialization files. The demo
CHAPTER 2. ANDROID SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 8
Figure 2.2: System Permissions of a User Installed Android Application
application’s package name is com.mohitr.cryptnoob. In Figure 2.2, the first command
which lists processes running on android containing the string rajumoh shows that the
application com.mohitr.cryptnoob has UID ’u0 a71’.
ps | grep rajumoh
The next command lists the application data directory. Installed applications have their
data directories placed in ’/data/data’. The output shows that the application’s data di-
rectory exists and its UID and GID are ’u0 a71’. This along with the read-write-execute
parameters shows that applications ’u0 a71’ has all permissions on the directory. Pro-
cesses and users belonging to the ’u0 a71’ group have read and execute permissions and
other users have execute permissions on the directory (i.e., they could open the directory).
ls -la /data/data | grep rajumoh
The third command extracts entries related to the application from the ’/data/system/pack-
ages.list’ file. packages.list and package.xml contain package name, UID, data directory
location and other parameters related to every installed application.
cat /data/system/packages.list | grep rajumoh
The last command shows the files that are related to ’Control Groups’ discussed earlier.
Control groups of application resources resides directly with the root user and the ap-
plication itself has limited control over it by virtue of group permissions. This prevents
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applications from changing their own control groups and gaining higher privileges
ls -la /acct/uid/10071
2.2.2 IPC
Using the above techniques, Android achieves a kind of application sandbox. Applica-
tions end up being enclosed in Linux user space with limited access to resources. The
next step in Android security is definition of schemes for secure interactions between ap-
plications and Android system services. The interaction between subsystems is called
Inter Process Communication (IPC). Android implements IPC using Binders. Figure 2.3
shows an example of 2 processes sharing information over binders. Binder implementa-
Figure 2.3: Android System Architecture.
tion used in Android is based on OpenBinder [8]. Memory space of a processes in Linux
can be accessed by the process user or system admin (root). Binder manages memory
space of processes by becoming owner of a part of memory space of each process, this
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memory space is read only to the process. The interface that provides handle to this binder
memory space of a process is the /dev/binder file. In a typical inter-process communica-
tion, consider two processes, Process A and Process B. When process A wants to send
information to process B, it would send a request for communication to the Binder driver.
Process A can accomplish this using the IBinder interface. The Binder driver then con-
tacts the Binder server, which writes the information to be exchanged onto the process
B’s binder managed memory space. The Binder server then notifies process B that there
is some information/data available at a particular memory location in its binder space. As
process B has read permission in its own binder memory space, it can access the informa-
tion.
Android Intents (Allow communication between activities among other things), Content-
Providers (database, file system management, etc) and Messengers are all implemented
using binders and one can identify these binders in the Android source code by searching
for the IBinder interface. The availability of this high level abstraction provides develop-
ers with tools to have secure access to application resources.
Binders form the basis of Capability Based security model of Android. When an appli-
cation is installed, it prompts the user for a set of permissions that the application would
use when installed. Application must declare its capabilities in its manifest file (Android-
Manifest.xml) inside uses-permission tag. When an application does this, it is declaring
its intentions of accessing specified Binders. Once an application has declared its inten-
tions, it will have access to the IBinder interface which contain method declarations for
available operation on the Binder. All objects that support IPC must implement IBinder
interface and are then referred to as Binder object. Binder objects perform IPC opera-
tions in a transactional fashion. Each transaction contains reference to the target object,
a unique global ID and address to the binder data buffer. PID and UID are added by the
Binder driver to prevent privilege escalation. The target object can then check the PID,
UID to perform operations on the Binder request. Also, as binders have global ID that
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is tracked by the kernel, it is not possible to duplicate binders. Though binder references
can be passed between processes, the execution of the binder is performed only by the
process which owns the binder’s memory space (and hence can perform checks).
So far, the discussion on binders have been for the use cases where references to binders
are explicitly obtained. However, there are services that are global. Services like Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, etc are not accessible to every application. Only applications that have re-
quested for services are provided access to the binder of these global services. Binder
providers (referred to as contextmanagers) can implement extra checks to validate service
usage.
2.2.3 System Applications
Android distinguishes applications as system and user installed applications. Android
devices have pre-installed default applications. Phone book, contacts, messaging and
google-playstore are a few common system applications. These might also include ven-
dor specific applications. System applications hold a special place in Android and are
installed in the ’/system/priv-app/ ’ directory. The applications must be signed with the
platform signing key and the applications protection level is set to ’signatureOrSystem’.
These applications have system level privileges and cannot be uninstalled by the mobile
user (only disabled). The reason behind this is to provide vendors with the options to
customize their products and provide system applications with some level of protection.
User installed applications are installed in the ’/data’ directory. These applications only
have the privileges that have been requested by them.
Another set of applications that do not fall under the above two categories are rooted ap-
plications, these are applications that request for ’root’ user permissions when executed.
Normal Andriod devices cannot recognize these requests. Rooting is not supported by
Google Android framework, as a result it is difficult to find official documentation on
rooting. However there are a few organizations that provide tools for rooting [9] [10].
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Though different rooting tools operate in different manner, they chiefly replace the exist-
ing kernel with ones that contain super user tools like ’su, chmod, chown, etc’. They also
might add various utility scripts that applications can later capitalize on. It must be noted
that these applications break the security architecture of Android.
2.2.4 Securing Android components with Signatures
Various components of Android are signed. From the time an Android device boots, upto
the running of an application, there are a series of signature checks that take place to val-
idate the integrity and authenticity of system. A few of these stages are discussed here.
Android uses verified boot [11] which provides the capability to detect software integrity,
’signal of integrity’ for remote attestation, encryption and Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE) [12]. The verified boot implementation uses dm-verity [13] [14] to map block de-
vices (here mapped to disk partitions usually) on Linux into virtual block devices. Each
virtual block device is assigned a hash value (4k - SHA 256). The block devices are
mapped into a hierarchy with each leaf on the tree containing a hash value calculated for
the block device. The nodes of the tree have a hash value, that is a hash function of its
leaves. This forces any changes in hash values of the nodes or leaves of the tree to be
reflected onto the root’s hash value (referred to as the root-hash). This hash value is ver-
ified with the Original Equipment Manufacturer’s (OEM) public RSA key (which has a
modulus of 2048 or higher). If there is a mismatch of keys, Google defines another set of
rules to notify the mobile user of a possible security breach on the device. The integrity
check of devices is very important against root-kit malware that can hide from detection
techniques, by embedding themselves into privileged locations on file system.
Code signing of applications is common across all mobile device platforms. Android
needs every application released to the play store to be signed with developer’s keys. This
enables trusted application updates. System applications also need to be signed, and the
keys are verified with the platform keys. Platform keys are maintained by the device man-
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ufacturer.
System update is another operation that employs signatures. When OEM’s send Over The
Air (OTA) updates to mobile devices, the update is downloaded as a zip file, extracted and
checked for signed keys from the OEM. The signature keys are present in ’/system/etc/se-
curity/otacerts.zip’. If the zip file passes verification, then the system enters recovery
mode and starts the update by placing files from the zip to correct locations.
2.2.5 SELinux
SELinux implements Mandatory Access Control (MAC) as opposed to DAC. However
these two methods of access control are often used together to bring security robustness.
DAC falls short when security designers need to dictate more fine grained access rules.
For example manufacturers might want to change the behavior of certain root processes
without going through the steps of creating a completely new GID for the process by
changing permissions of all the files related to the process. This could be tedious and
in worse cases leak security if configurations are missed. As a result Google started the
SEAndroid project which ports SELinux to Android. SEAndroid was first introduced in
Android 4.2 but it went mainstream with Android 4.4.
SEAndroid operates in three modes, ’permissive’, where security violations are just logged,
’enforcing’, where violations are denied and logged and the last mode being ’disabled’.
SELinux consists of 4 elements.
• Object managers (OM) : When processes attempt to access a resource, they are
termed as ’subjects’ and the resource being accessed is called the ’object’. Object
managers decide whether a ’subject’ has permission to access an ’object’. The ob-
ject information in maintained by the Object managers. OM is also responsible for
making sure that the decision is carried out. This decision making is also referred
to as ’action’.
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• Access vector cache (AVC) : OM, refer to the AVC to check if the subjects have
access to the object. AVC maintains a cache of recent requests to improve perfor-
mance of decision making. In case AVC cannot find the request in its cache, it asks
the Security server for the decision and caches the decision.
• Security server : Security server resides in the kernel and maintains all security
policies.
• Security policy : Security policies are a set of rules specified by the system admin-
istrator that SELinux uses. It cannot be changed by subjects once SELinux has been
enabled.
SEAndroid supports only type enforcement. This means that all process that fall under
the purview of SEAndroid must be associated by a type. The type definition is done in
security context or simply label. It is a colon separated string containing the 4 parameters
• user-name (always set to u)
• role (set to r or defaults to object r)
• type
• Multi-Layer Security (MLS) security range (always set to s0)
The security context ’type’ can be associated with a set of attributes. Policies can be dif-
ferentiated based on their ’type’ and its attributes. Roles can be assigned to ’subjects’,
where each role can be associated with security context ’type’. SELinux also allows tran-
sition rules for type and domain. A detailed discussion of the policy rules would be out
of scope of this study.
SEAndroid cannot populate its ’Security Server’ with too many rules as that would lead
to performance issues. As a result, it does not implement MLS, does not include too
many users or roles. SEAndroid secures Android Binders. Android Binders have security
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hooks that SEAndroid can use to enforce security on Binders. Similarly many changes
were made to other Android libraries to allow for SEAndroid to enforce policies. File
system libraries are also modified to include security context on file system attributes (as
SELinux reads file system attributes to obtain security context of a file). An extensive
discussion on the changes to SELinux for Android have been well documented elsewhere
[15] [16] [17].
Chapter 3
NFC in Android
Near field communication or NFC allows communication between two closely placed de-
vices through electromagnetic induction and traces its origin back to Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID). NFC does not refer to a single technology, but is a conglomerate
of different radio frequency technologies like ISO/IEC 14443, FeliCa [18], GSMA NFC
Standard and Single Wire Protocol [19]. Information of these technologies can be found
on the NFC homepage [20]. Today NFC has come a long way with new innovative use
cases emerging everyday. NFC operates in the 13.56 MHz radio frequency, with sup-
ported speeds of bit transfer being 106, 212 or 424 Kbit/s [21].
NFC can operate in three modes.
1. Card Emulation mode. NFC device can emulate NFC card and chips. When in
emulation mode, other NFC devices can read the NFC data (also referred to as NFC
tag)
2. Reader/Writer mode. This allows NFC device to read data embedded in NFC tags
or from devices in Card Emulation mode
3. Peer-to-peer mode. To enable ad-hoc exchange of information, peer-to-peer mode
is used
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NFC devices have a loop antenna [22] which uses magnetic induction to communicate
between devices. When a NFC device or a NFC tag comes in close proximity of an-
other NFC device, an effective air-core transformer is formed. In case of NFC tags, this
generates the current needed to make the tag functional. This is then used to gather in-
formation from the NFC tag/device. NFC tags are special and the data coding supported
on NFC devices are Miller coding and Manchester coding. NFC devices are also capable
of transmitting data at the same time (peer-to-peer). NFC devices support two modes of
communication
1. Passive communication. When an NFC device exchanges information within the
magnetic field of other NFC device without using its own magnetic field, it is re-
ferred as passive communication. NFC tags operate in passive mode. Fully capable
device can also operate in passive communication mode. Passive communication
makes use of NFC possible with passive entities like credit cards, game tags, keys
and tokens. This feature, along with the ability of mobile devices to communicate
on the Internet makes NFC devices suitable candidate for on-line identification and
authentication.
2. Active communication. In active communication both NFC entities can generate
their own NFC fields. When both the NFC entities can generate their own field, it
raises the possibilities of ad-hoc communication. Peer-to-peer communication uses
this ability.
3.1 NFC use cases
NFC devices have varied applications in real world.
1. Mobile payment - Mobile payment through NFC devices is already in use to-
day. Use of mobile devices operating in active communication mode to make pay-
ments have been implemented as Google Wallet on the Android platform and Ap-
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ple Pay[Apple Pay], to name a few. NFC technology is also being used with credit
cards, where one can get NFC enabled cards.
2. Data transfer - Two NFC enabled devices can be used to transfer data between two
devices. This, however, is not a popular use case due to availability of other, better
modes.
3. Identification and authentication - NFC devices can substitute RFID’s. All RFID
use cases are valid here. As most popular mobile devices have started using NFC, in
near future, it could replace RFID’s for personal identification. It can also provide
additional functionality, by using Internet connectivity of mobile devices to provide
robust identification systems
4. Gaming - NFC and QR code readers have enabled the possibilities of real world
gaming scenarios. A number of scavenger hunting games are available on Android
Play Store which use NFC
3.2 NFC and Android
Android provides extensive support for NFC on its NFC capable devices. A list of sup-
ported devices can be found on the NFC website. Android provides developers with high
level Application Programming Interfaces (API) to access all NFC features. These li-
braries abstract the underlying native libraries and provide the developer with easy to use
extension to be able to operate with NFC. At the system level NFCService takes care of
NFC operation. Application developers do not have direct access to this service. Instead
they utilize libraries available under the package ’com.Android.nfc’ and invoke operation
on NFCService through event driven model. For example, if the application wants to read
NFC tags of a certain type, it would register callback method with the NFCService. When
the device reads a tag, the NFCService would handle it. Based on the tag data, NFCSer-
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vice determines the application that has registered for the tag, and invokes the registered
application.
All three modes of operation follow the above work flow. An event driven model was
important as the designers wanted to minimize user input when operating with NFC oper-
ations. Another reason for the event driven model was security, as the NFCprotocol itself
does not provide any security features. Security must be achieved by the developers using
encryption and cryptographic hash functions.
Android encapsulates NFC messages into NDEFMessage (NDEF stands for NFC Data
Exchange Format) object. NDEFMessage can contain a number of NDEFRecords. The
actual data is part of NDEFRecords. A NDEFRecord contains three fields : type, id and
payload. The type field specifies the type of the payload. A table of available types on
Android is shown in figure 3.1. Id field is not mandatory and the payload field is filled
based on the type specified. An Android application must first register itself with NFC-
Service stating the type of NFCMessage that the Android application would respond to.
When NFCService receives a message, it opens the NDEFMessage array and picks the
first NFCRecord. The type and the payload specified in the first record determines the
target application that would be activated/chosen by NFCService to complete the request.
For example, a Credit Card Wallet Android application would first register with the NFC-
Service stating that it would respond to NDEFMessage from a NFC enabled Credit Card.
When such a card is brought in contact with Android device’s NFC field, NFCService
would recognize the Credit Card tag and invoke the Credit Card Wallet application.
3.3 HCE Overview
Hardware-based card emulation (HCE) is used by Google Wallet application. Its opera-
tion sequences are worth noting as they are a bit different from normal NFC implemen-
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Figure 3.1: NFC Record Types
tations. HCE was developed by Doug Yeager for CyanogenMod and later merged into
Android base. Unlike normal NFC operation where NFCService handles all operations
and developers could only place callback requests (in an event drive model) in their code,
in HCE the entities interact with each other. HCE runs continuously in the background
and is coded to respond to external cards, thus performing two way communication.
Chapter 4
Basic Concepts of Cryptography
This chapter covers the basic techniques and concepts that are in use in the field of cryp-
tography. The chapter starts with symmetric key cryptosystems, followed by cipher oper-
ational modes and public key cryptosystems. The chapter concludes with a discussion on
Digital signatures and Hash functions.
4.1 Alice, Bob and Eve
Cryptology employs the use of fictional characters to present complex theoratical situa-
tions. The most common names in use are Alice, Bob, Eve and Mallory. The names Alice
and Bob were first used in the papers presented by Rivest-Shamir-Adleman. The names
Alice and Bob are used to represent two parties attempting to have secure communication.
The name Eve is used for a third party trying to eavesdrop on private conversation. The
name Mallory is used for a third party with malacious intent towards the conversation be-
tween Alice and Bob. This study would also employ the use of these fictional characters
to enable easy understanding of cryptographic concepts.
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4.2 Symmetric Key Cryptosystems
4.2.1 Horst Feistel’s Lucifer cipher
Horst Feistel’s work on encryption forms the basis for most modern encryption schemes.
Feistel’s scheme builds up on the older schemes of ’ideal block encryption’. His research
into the ideal block encryption and his attempts to weed out its deficiencies lead to the
proposal of the Lucifer cipher.
Ideal block encryption as Feistel referred to it, is the simplest form of block substitution
cipher. It is a scheme where a n-bit input is transformed to a n-bit output. The function
used to perform the operation is called the transform function. A one-to-one transform
function can be devised that gives a unique result for each input block. The transform
function must also have an inverse, so that scrambled data can be converted back to orig-
inal. For example, let us consider a 3-bit to 3-bit block substitution (block size is 3). A
3-bit block can have 23 = 8 values. One possible transform table could look like Table
4.1
Input Block Value Output Block Value
0 1
1 7
2 0
3 3
4 4
5 6
6 2
7 5
Table 4.1: Simple Transform Table
A 3-bit sample like 110 with a decimal value of 6, gets transformed to 2 (from the ta-
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ble) which in binary is 010. A reverse transformation can be generated by reversing the
above transform example. A preliminary cryptanalysis of this scheme brings about the
following observations.
• This scheme is similar to substitution cipher for small block sizes and hence vul-
nerable to statistical analysis.
• Another concern is the key size. In the above example the table itself is a key.
Consider that the same table can be used for both encryption and decryption (as
they are reversible) then the key size in this particular case would be (6 bits) * 8 =
48 bits. Or in formulation for a n-bit to n-bit substitution (2 ∗ n) ∗ 2n bits.
In the same period of time, Shannon et al [23] had proposed the concepts diffusion and
confusion to solve susceptibility to statitical cryptanalysis and large key sizes of robust
encryption schemes.
• Diffusion : The mechanics by which plain text statistics is distorted/damaged by
having every bit of plain text effect multiple cipher text bits.
• Confusion : The mechanics that would make is difficult to deduce the relation
between the plain text statistics and the cipher text statistics.
With the scheme for block ciphers as the basis and also comments from Shannon about
confusion and diffusion, Feistel introduced two new concepts.
• Substitution. The process by which plain text or plain text block is replaced by ci-
pher text or block. Substitution is the logical equivalent of ’confusion’ that Shannon
et al [23] talked about. However, substitution alone does not add diffusion. Feistal,
instead divides encryption process to rounds. Each round introduces substitution
which is derived from the key and the round itself.
• Permutation. The process of permutation in rearrangement of bits. This further
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confuses the relation between the plain text and cipher text. In Feistel’s , the sim-
plest permutation of interchanging the two halves of a block is done.
Describing Feistel’s encryption becomes easier with the following description. The al-
gorithm starts with taking the input plain text block. This block is then divided into two
parts, conveniently called the left half (LH) and the right half (RH). The plain text then
undergoes a series of repeated operations called rounds. In each round, the process of
substitution and permutation are carried out to make the plain text jumbled.
• LHp+1 = RHp
In each pth round, the right side of the text (RHp) is set as the left side (LHp+1) of
the next round. This contributes to the permutation operation.
• RHp+1 = LHp ⊕RoundFunction(RHp, Kp)
Each round has a derived round key Kp, which is derived from the encryption key.
The derived key (Kp) along with the right half of the text (RHp) are passed through
a round function. This round function contributes for the substitution and is re-
ferred to as a S-box operation. As one can see, the formulas mentioned above are
linear in nature, and given the nature of XOR operation, each round is reversible.
Also removal of the round function, would still make the encryption scheme work,
but it would just end up being a XOR encryption with only the benefit of permu-
tations. So, the only operation that makes feistal cipher interesting is the S-boxes.
It removes linearity from the system by introducing substitution. As solving lin-
ear equations is easier, cryptographers usually avoid their presence in the system.
Forming this algorithm as the basis, DES was proposed as a encryption standard to
the NIST encryption standard selection process.
CHAPTER 4. BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRYPTOGRAPHY 25
4.2.2 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
DES is similar to Fiestel’s encryption in many ways except for its implementation of S-
Boxes. Similar to Feistel’s, DES divides the plain text block into two halves. The right
half becomes the left half in the next step and the left half is XORed with the right half
and passed through a round function. The implementation of the round function is more
concrete in the DES. The round function, which is also referred to as the S-box, takes care
of the substitution process.
DES implements 8 S-boxes, one for each round. These are implemented as lookup tables
which maps a 6-bit data to 4-bit data. The 2 most significant bits of the 6-bit data, form
the column of the s-box and the last four bits form the row. Mapping to 4-bit is obtained
at the intersection of the 2-bit column and the 4-bit row.
As the S-boxes are static, they have been an area of concern for cryptanalyst and have
been heavily researched for back doors. Through out my research, I have found that the
cryptanalysis of S-boxes serve valuable information to algorithm developers.
DES was broken with demonstrable products presented by EFF in 1998 [24] and COPA-
COBANA in 2006 [25]. Theoretical breakthroughs against DES started with the seminal
work of Eli Biham and Adi Shamir published under the name of Differential cryptanalysis
and could discover keys by using 247 chosen plain texts. Other works by Mitsuru Matsui
published as Linear cryptanalysis could discover keys by using 242know plain texts.
4.2.3 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Advanced Encryption standard is the successor of DES and replaced it under the 2001
proposal by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). AES is roughly sim-
ilar to DES. It has a round function that incorporates permutation using sub-keys derived
from the symmetric key. It has a substitution function which is implemented using S-
boxes in a manner similar to DES. Each round function is repeated a predefined number
of times to evenly scramble plain text input. In fact, the above set of similarities, are
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marked property of set of cryptosystems, collectively referred to as ”Iterated Cryptosys-
tems”, of which AES and DES are part.
Stages of AES Encryption.
1. AES encryption starts by dividing the plain text into 128 bit block sizes (16, 8-bit
bytes). Each 128 bit block is represented as a columnar 4x4 matrix which is referred
to as the Input State.
2. The Input State is then bit-wise XORed with the sub key that is generated for this
stage. Key management in AES is done by a key scheduling algorithm that gener-
ates 44 32-bit words, with each round getting a 4 word sub key.
3. The State then enters the first round function. Each round function is a sequence of
following operations.
• Substitute byte : An S box is used to make substitutions on the State matrix.
In AES, S-box is a 16x16 matrix. Each byte in the State matrix is substituted
with a byte in the S-box. For a byte S in State matrix, the 4 most significant
bits of S mark the row in the S-box and the least significant 4-bits mark the
column in the S-box. Unlike DES, where the S-box has fixed values, in AES,
S-box values are precomputed as follows.
In AES, the operations are all performed in a Galois Field of 28 represented as
GF (28) with the reducing polynomial for multiplication as x8+x4+x3+x+1.
A brief description of Galois Fields is warranted here. Both modular arith-
metic and Finite Field theory (of which Galois Field is a part) are used in
cryptography to bound mathematical operations to certain limits. In choos-
ing GF (28), for arithmetic operations, AES ensures that any operation on two
8-bit bytes would always yield an 8-bit byte as output. The 2 in GF (28) is re-
ferred to as the characteristic of the field and 8 is the order. The characteristic
signifies that all operations are to be performed modulo 2 and the maximum
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degree of the polynomial is 8. In GF (28), each byte is represented as a poly-
nomial of form below.
Σaix
i where 0 ≤ i ≤ 8
A byte 11001100 is represented as x8 + x7 + x4 + x3. The behavior of the 4
operations can be simplified. Addition and subtraction are same as XOR (as
the operations are modulo 2).
(x8 + x7 + x4 + x3)(+/−)(x8 + x5 + x4 + x3) = (x5 + x7)
Division is similar to polynomial division with the additions carried out as
XOR. Multiplication of two polynomials can cause resulting polynomials of
degree as large as 16. This would not fit into a 8-bit byte. So, a reduction
is done on polynomial using an irreducible polynomial in the GF (28) field.
AES uses x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 (other irreducible polynomials exist in this
field), which is used to divide the resultant of multiplication and the remainder
is chosen as the result. Irreducibility is when the said polynomial is relatively
prime to all other members of the field. The irreducible polynomial acts as
modulo. So the multiplication of two polynomials a(x) and b(x) becomes
a(x) ∗ b(x) (mod (x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1)).
• Multiplicative Inverse : Irreducible polynomials are also of interest when the
need arises to determine a multiplicative inverse. Inverses are handy in revers-
ing the operational direction, that is when trying to decrypt an encrypted byte.
Two polynomials e(x) and d(y) are multiplicative inverse of each other over
modulo m(x) when there exists two other polynomials v(x) and u(x) such that
a(x).v(x) + b(x).u(x) = 1 (mod m(x)).
Using the above as the base theory and considering that all following opera-
tions will be done in GF (28), following is the AES S-box generation method.
AES generates an S-box for a byte YX where Y is the row value (4-bit MSB)
in the S-box and X is the column. AES then determines the inverse of YX
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in GF (28) with the chosen irreducible polynomial. Let the inverse be labeled
b with each bit being (b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7). AES then applies an affine
transformation over the byte b. Byte b is first multiplied with a 8x8 matrix
(multiplication matrix), then the result is XORed with a 8x1 matrix represen-
tation of decimal number 99 to give the resultant b’. Both the matrices are
fixed and have been chosen carefully to minimize cases where both S-box and
inverse S-box map the same values. The output b’ takes its place in the S-box.
The inverse S-box is generated in a similar fashion. AES generates an IS-box
for a byte YX where Y is the row value (4-bit MSB) in the S-box and X is
the column. YX is multiplied with the inverse of the 8x8 multiplicative matrix
and then XORed with the 8x1 matrix of decimal number 5.
S-box is used during encryption and IS-box is used during decryption.
• Shift Rows : Rows are cyclically left shifted, with the first row being un-
touched, the second shifted by one byte, the third by 2 bytes and the last row
by 3 bytes. During decryption, rows are cyclically right shifted. Row shifting
tries to remove the columnar relation between bytes.
• Mixing Columns : The state is further multiplied with a fixed transformation
matrix. The transformation matrix’s first row has values 2,3,1,1 and the rest of
the rows are cyclically right shifted. The inverse mix is done using an inverse
of the transformation matrix used in the forward encryption scenario. The
inverse transformation matrix is multiplied with state. Again, all operations in
this stage are performed under GF (28).
• Adding Round Key : The state is XORed with the 128 bit round key, both in
the forward and reverse case. The above set of 4 operations forms a round
function in AES.
4. AES-128 uses 128 bit key with 10 rounds and 16 byte sub key, AES-192 uses 192
bit key with 12 rounds and 24 byte sub-key and AES-256 uses 256 bit key with 14
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rounds and 32 byte sub key.
5. The final round is different from other round functions and does only substitution,
shift rows and adding round key.
6. Decryption starts in the similar manner of performing the initial transformation of
adding round key. This is followed with the round function. The order of op-
erations in the round function are also different here. Each round performs row
shift, followed by substitution, followed by adding round key and finally mixing of
columns. Final round is also different in decryption with the order being shift rows,
substitution and add rows key in that order. Key expansion is also reversed during
decryption.
7. Key expansion for AES-128 would need 11 sub-keys of size 4 bytes, that is 44
bytes, from the main key. The first 16 bytes are derived directly from the key. For
the next set of keys, expansion is done per word basis. For each new word is derived
from the immediate previous word and the forth last word. If the word’s position in
the key is not a multiple of 4, the new word is a XOR of the last word and the 4th
last word. If not, then the following is done. The last word is transformed in a left
cyclic shift. The word is then substituted using a S-box. The resultant word is then
XORed with a 4 byte counter (with the count value updated to the most significant
word). After this operation, the counter (referred to as Rcon) is incremented.
4.3 Cipher Operational modes
One would have noticed by now that, if AES alone was used to encrypt a message, it
would accomplish this by encrypting one block at a time. In cases where the plain text
has a different size than multiples of the AES block size, padding techniques are applied.
With such a set up, seeing a cipher text, an attacker can guess the type of encryption al-
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gorithm being used. Also, given a plain text block, AES always returns the same cipher
text block. This information can be used by an attacker in crypt analysis. Information on
computer systems are almost always structured to assist in easy translation of messages.
This is done in form of Extensible Markup Language (XML), JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON), Network packets, etc. Because of the structured nature of these formats, there are
repetitions withing the message or in its descriptors. A cipher which produces the same
cipher text for a given plain text, would leak information about the structure of the data.
This is not desirable. Also, the knowledge of the structure of a cipher text for a given
plain text, enables cryptanalysis to improve key discovery methods using techniques like
differential analysis (which was very successful in defeating DES).
To overcome the above problems, several modes of operation were defined for symmet-
ric key encryption algorithms. These modes of operations are not tightly coupled with
any give symmetric cipher and any cipher technique can use these operational modes to
prevent the above set of information leaks. The idea behind these modes is to make each
encryption operation dependent on the previous operation, so that cipher text repetitions
can be avoided. Following are the well know techniques in use today. All of these modes
are supported on the Android mobile platform.
4.3.1 Cipher Block Chain (CBC) Mode
CBC was formulated to eliminate the problem of same plain texts generating same cipher
text. This was achieved by performing XOR operation on the current plain text block with
the previous cipher text block. Encryption and decryption in this mode can be represented
using the formulas
Cj = E(K, (Pj ⊕ Cj−1))
Pj = D(K,Cj)⊕ Cj−1
The implementation, however, is a bit different. This is because when deciphering, one
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would not know what the previous plain text is. To solve this Initialization Vector (IV)
was introduced, which is a randomly chosen number, which both the parties using the
cipher system must know before hand.
Encryption : C1 = E(K,P1 ⊕ IV )andCj = E(K, (Pj ⊕ Cj−1))
Decryption : P1 = D(K,C1)⊕ IV andPj = D(K,Cj)⊕ Cj−1
One apparent problem with this system is that each plain text (not the plain text block)
with always produce the same cipher text as long as the same IV is used. A way of solving
this is using nonce (which are essentially counters which are either directly the result of
message exchange or more universal counters like the clock). Another problem with CBC
is that it leaks information about the type of cipher in use. The output is always multiples
of the block sizes of the block chain.
4.3.2 Cipher Feedback Chain (CFC) Mode
Unlike the CBC, CFB is a stream cipher. In CFB, cryptographic operations are performed
on each bit of data. Data is not divided into block of bytes to perform encryption. Because
there is no padding, the output cipher text is the same size as the input plain text. In CFB
following steps are followed for encryption.
1. Encryption starts with the selection of an IV. This IV is then encrypted with the key
K to produce a set of bits, which are adjusted to the size of the plain text choosing
Least Significant Bit (LSB)
2. The plain text is then XORed with the bits selected to produce the cipher text
3. This cipher text, then takes the role of IV in step (1) and process (1) through (2) are
repeated till the plain text is exhausted
Decryption is performed as follows:
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1. Decryption start with the IV. This IV is then encrypted with the key K to produce a
set of bits, which are adjusted to the size of the plain text (choosing LSB)
2. Cipher text is XORed with the bits selected in step (1)
3. Cipher text then takes the role of IV in step (1) and the steps (1) through (2) and
repeated till the cipher text is exhausted
4.3.3 Output Feedback (OFB) Mode
OFB is closer to a full key substitution cipher. In OFB, a key as large as the plain text is
created, and then XOR this key to the plain text to produce a cipher text. In operation,
this very large key is created using the following method.
1. OFB uses nonce instead of an IV. It encrypt the Nonce with the cipher key to pro-
duce an intermediate output.
2. The output of the previous stage is fed back to be encrypted with the key, to produce
another set of output. This continues till the size limit of the plain text is reached.
3. All the outputs generated in the previous steps are appended, in the same order of
their execution to generate a really large key with is XORed with the plain text.
Decryption occurs in a similar manner, where the generated key is XORed with the cipher
text to produce the plain text. OFB uses a nonce here, because otherwise the same IV
would produce the same cipher text for the same plain text, block by block. As this is one
of the main goals that lead to the creation of these modes of operations, the nonce solution
is the way to go. One advantage that OFB has is, error in one byte of plain text would
not effect the entire cipher text. The error will be confined to the said block. However the
same property also leads to bit substitution attacks of the cipher stream. For example if it
is know that the first n bits of the message carry a message checksum (for integrity), an
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attack can modify these bits to fail the checksum and thus forcing the receiver to discard
the message as invalid causing a denial of service attack.
4.3.4 Counter (CTR) Mode
CTR is similar to OFB, but instead of taking feedback from the previous output, it uses
counters to generate a intermediate outputs. The encryption works as follows.
1. The counter is initialized to a random value.
2. This counter is encrypted with the encryption key to produce an intermediate key.
3. The counter is then incremented and the steps (1) to (2) are repeated. All the outputs
generated in the previous steps are appended, in the same order of their execution
to generate a really large key with is XORed with the plain text.
Decryption occurs in a similar manner, where the generated key is XORed with the ci-
pher text to produce the plain text. CTR is often chosen for is easy implementation, fast
operation and parallel generation of intermediate sub keys (as there is no dependence of
previous sub key generation).
4.3.5 Galois Counter Mode (GCM)
This is a fairly new mode that is well supported on Android and as its name suggests is
an extension of CTR mode with operations in Galois field. It improves upon CTR mode
by adding authentication tags.
1. After the CTR mode produces the first cipher text block, a Galois Hash of an IV is
XORed with the first cipher text block. Let us call this hash as GF1
2. GF1 is then XORed with cipher text 2 of the CTR output.
3. This feed back operation is repeated till all plain text blocks are exhausted.
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Note that the above steps generate just the authentication tags. The actual cipher text is
still generated using CTR mode with the CTR counter always initiated at 0. The output
that is transmitted to the recipient contains the IV (used for generating authentication tag),
the cipher text and the authentication tag. This takes care of message integrity.
4.4 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography are radically different from symmetric key cryptography. Public
key cryptography works with pairs of keys instead of a single secret key. This eliminates
the need of key sharing which was necessary in symmetric cryptosystems. However, pub-
lic key cryptosystems come with computational overhead which make them less likely
candidates for encryption of large block of messages. As a result, public key cryptosys-
tems are limited to key exchange and digital signatures. All crypto systems today, use
key negotiation protocols that are handled by these public key systems and the message
encryption carried out by AES-256 or other symmetric key cipher.
The basic structure of a public key crypto systems is as defined below.
1. Each party who wishes to participate in a public key crypto system must generate a
pair of public and private keys.
2. The party then shares their public key with other participants or publishes it to a
lookup server for public access.
There are two ways now, in which Bob and Alice (the aforementioned fictional char-
acters) can have a secure conversation. In the first method public key is used to encrypt
the message. It works in the following manner.
1. Let us say that Alice and Bob have both generated their key pairs and published
their public keys.
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2. If Bob wants to send a message to Alice, he would encrypt the message with Alice’s
public key and send it to Alice.
3. Alice can read the message by using her private key to decipher the message sent
by Bob
In the second method private key is used to encrypt the message.
1. Bob sends message to Alice, by encrypting the message with his private key.
2. Alice can read the message by deciphering it with Bob’s public key.
In the first method, it is impossible for Alice to figure out who sent the message. Any-
one can pose as Bob and Alice would have no way of finding out. In the second method,
Alice can determine with certainty that the message was indeed sent by Bob, as the mes-
sage could have only been encrypted by Bob. The following sections discuss some well
known public key crypto systems.
4.4.1 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
Unlike the older cypher systems, the basis of public key crypto systems is based on strong
mathematical proofs in the field of modular arithmetic, field theory and prime numbers.
RSA is based on following proofs. For integers X,E,D and N the following equation
XED (mod N) = X
holds when E and D are multiplicative inverse modulo ϕ(N) (the Euler totient function ).
Given any two primes p and q, ϕ(pq) = (p− 1)(q − 1), would create a group in modulo
ϕ(pq) where each element will have a multiplicative inverse. So one can formulate an
equation where, if C is the cipher text, M is the message, e is the encryption key, d is the
decryption key and n is ϕ(pq) of two primes p and q, the following equation emerges
M ed (mod n) = (M e)d (mod n) = Cd (mod n) = M
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The above equations, hence, shows that encryption key is a multiplicative inverse of the
decryption key and p and q are two very large prime numbers. Either one of e or d be-
comes a private key and the other the public key. Both the public keys and the number
n are known publicly. The security of the RSA protocol hinges on the fact that it is very
difficult to factorize n and determine the values of p and q, which would reveal the de-
cryption key given the knowledge of encryption key.
4.4.2 Diffie Hellman (DH) Key exchange
DH key exchange depends on similar mathematical principles used in RSA algorithm.
Following steps illustrate its operation.
• DH start with publicly know elements, a prime number q and a number αwhich is
primitive root of q.
• Alice chooses a private keyXa and generates a public key Ya using Ya = αXa (mod q)
• Bob uses the same operation to generate Xb and Yb.
• Both exchange their public keys and can determine K using
K = (Ya)
Xb (mod q) = αXa.Xb (mod q) = (αXb)Xa (mod q) = (Yb)
Xa . (mod q)
Unlike RSA, the security of DH depends on DLP (Discrete Logarithmic problems). In
the above case, if an attacker wanted to compute Xa given that he knows Ya, Yb, α and q,
then he would have to calculate
Ya = α
Xa (mod q)
==> logαYa = Xa (under modulo arithmetic)
This is a difficult task and hence adds security to the system.
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4.4.3 El Gamal Cryptosystem
El Gamal system also uses the same theory as DH and its security is based on difficulty
of solving discrete logarithmic problem. This system, however is a complete message
encryption systems and not just a key exchange system.
• El Gamal system start with publicly know elements, a prime number q and a number
α which is primitive root of q.
• Alice selects a private keyXa less than q−1. She then calculates Ya = αXa (mod q).
The public key is a tuple of q, α, Ya. This is then shared with Bob.
• Bob now needs to send the message M. He selects a random integer k < q. He
calculates the key K using Alice’s public key Ya using
K = (Ya)
k (mod q). He also calculates
C1 = α
k (mod q) and
C2 = KM (mod q). He then transmits the pair C1, C2 to Alice.
• Alice gets
K = (C1)
Xa (mod q) = (αk)Xa (mod q) = (αXa)k (mod q) = (Ya)
k (mod q) = K
She then uses K to get the Message
M = (C2K
−1) (mod q) = KMK−1 (mod q).
4.4.4 Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
A newer member to the public crypto systems. It uses a mixture of Elliptic curve theory,
Galois Field theory and modular arithmetic to perform key exchanges between parties.
The difficulty of solving DLP is again used here in ECDH to provide security. Going in
depth with the mathematics involved in this algorithm would take sizable portion of this
document and is hence avoided.
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4.5 Cryptographic Hash Functions
4.5.1 Message Digest
Message digests are one way hash functions that take large number of bits as input and
generate fixed length outputs. Message digests are implemented in the same manner as
encryption operation modes like CBC or CTR. However instead of returning outputs of
the same size as input plain/cipher text, they return fixed length outputs. It can be of use
in many situations.
• Can be used to determine message integrity. For finding another message that has
the exact digest output as the original message is through brute force.
• Identification and versioning of files. File versioning systems like Git make use of
message digests to track different version of files.
• Passwords are usually not stored in systems, instead their message digests are
stored.
4.5.2 Digital Signatures
Digital Signatures are used to verify the source of information. If Alice sent a message,
and Bob wanted to verify that the sender was indeed Alice, this could be achieved using
digital signatures. Alice would create a message digest of the pain text, and encrypt the
message digest with her private key. She would then send both the encrypted message di-
gest and the encrypted message to Bob. Bob can then decipher the message using Alice’s
public key to validate both the authenticity and integrity of the message.
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4.5.3 Message Authentication Code (MAC)
A common use of message digests is to authenticate messages. MAC functions are pro-
vided with a private key (to validate the source) and the message. The message is passed
through a message digest and the output hash value of the digest is encrypted with the
private key. This enables users to check the authenticity and integrity of the message at
the same time.
Chapter 5
Secure Messaging applications
A fairly common form of communication is messaging through portable devices. Messag-
ing could refer to SMS/MMS over telephony or Internet messaging. Information carried
in messaging could be text or multimedia. It could carry the most benign form of conver-
sation or could be a heated political debate in a messaging group. Exchange of banking
details and Internet passwords using messaging is not uncommon. Given the value of
information that passes through messaging applications, they are prime targets for attack-
ers. Lately messaging applications have attracted interests from governments. Though the
intentions behind governments tapping into messaging streams might be noble, it does vi-
olate user’s privacy. With the resources which governments have at their disposal, along
with the fact that many cryptographic schemes used today have been pioneered and pro-
moted by them, many security experts are worried. As a result, lately most messaging
applications are putting effort in securing their applications. It also provides us with an
opportunity to promote awareness in secure information exchange.
It has been difficult to implement encrypted messaging (or any form of encrypted informa-
tion exchange) as encryption schemes often conflict with user experience. To help people
choose good messaging applications, the Electronic Frontier Foundation maintains a list
of usable messaging applications and rates them based on the following 7 questions [26].
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• Is the message encrypted in transit?
• Encrypted so the provider can read it?
• Can you verify contacts’ identities?
• Are past communications secure if your keys are stolen?
• Is the code open to independent review?
• Is security design properly documented?
• Has there been any recent code audit?
With the help of the above list and considering the availability of source code and docu-
mentation, the following two applications were used to understand how modern crypto-
graphic application function.
5.1 TextSecure
TextSecure is an open and federated messaging application managed by Open Whisper
Systems [27]. A similar applications is available in Apple App Store by the name of
Signal. TextSecure provides asynchronous end to end encryption with secure transfer of
text, group messages and media files. The application passes all the set parameters by
EFF and has been recommended by many security experts. The following section covers
in detail the technologies used in TextSecure.
5.1.1 Operation
TextSecure initially provided support for SMS/MMS and IM. The support for SMS/MMS
was dropped, however a fork of the project called SMSSecure was created to support SM-
S/MMS [28]. TextSecure now uses Google Cloud Messaging as communication medium.
The application provides the following key features.
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• Communication is possible with Signal users on Apple Appstore users.
• Allows local encryption of user messages.
• Forgets pass phrase after certain interval.
• Prevents screen shots.
• Automatically deletes old messages and conversation threads.
• Works seamlessly even when receivers do not use TextSecure.
When user uses it for the first time, the application provides the user with a public key
which is 33 bytes P-256 Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) key. Users can manually read
and exchange the key or they can use QR code scanners to exchange each others keys.
Once the keys are exchanged the applications can securely transmit information between
them. If the receiver of the message is not an TextSecure or Signal user, the messages will
be transmitted without encryption, hence providing a seamless data exchange.
The cryptographic system used in this application is a derivative of Off-the-Record (OTR)
Messaging Protocol. OTR is used to provide an encryption scheme for Internet messag-
ing. It assumes that Instant Messaging (IM) messages are in-order. It assumes that some
messages might never be delivered and that attackers could perform denial of service
attacks, but the secrecy of the message could never be compromised. It also provides
forward secrecy by using ephemeral keys (more on this later).
Forward secrecy is said to have been implemented if compromised global keys does not
compromise past session keys. Forward secrecy is used in IPSec as an optional feature,
SSH, OTR, OpenSSL and Diffie-Hellman RSA. Forward secrecy in OTR is achieved us-
ing Ephemeral key exchanges. In Ephemeral key exchange, intermediate messages are
encrypted using fresh set of keys (which are derivative of the main public key). Once the
conversation is over, there temporary keys are discarded. As these messages have been
encrypted using ephemeral keys, exposure of public keys would not compromise past
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messages. This in contrast with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) which is a popular encryption
scheme provided by email service providers. PGP does not implement forward secrecy.
All messages in PGP are encrypted with one key and compromise of global key can com-
promise every message ever encrypted using it.
While OTR is a novel scheme, it’s failure to provide asynchronous message transfer
prompted TextSecure to borrow features from another cryptographic scheme called the
SCIMP Ratchet. The following sections discuss OTR and SCIMP ratchet and how TextSe-
cure reaches a middle ground to meet the application’s requirement of asynchronous mes-
saging with forward secrecy.
5.1.2 OTR
The OTR [29] technology version 3.4 ensures secrecy in IM by assuming in-order mes-
sages. It uses SIGMA [30] protocol as the Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE). AKE
is the mechanism by which parties involved in cryptograpic communication can securely
exchange keys and authenticate identity of each other. SIGMA uses Diffie-Hellman (DH)
as the basis and improves upon it using AES and hash functions. Before going into AKE
scheme, an introduction to nomenclature is provided. From here on, it is considered that
DH mean Diffie-Hellman, g as the generator of a 1536-bit prime number and all modulo
operations are done on that prime. pubA and pubB are public keys of Alice and Bob.
The following are the AKE steps
1. Bob picks a 128-bit random number r and at least 320-bits of another random num-
ber x. Unlike the usual DH where Bob would just pick a random number and raise
it to the power of g and sends it’s modulo over the network, in this case Bob sends
AESr(g
x) and HASH(gx). Both the sender and receiver use the same HASH
function. This enables gx to be sent securely and also be verifiable by Alice.
2. Alice then picks up her own random number y (at least 320 bits) and sends Bob gy.
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3. Bob calculates s = (gy)x. This is his DH secret key for the messages. Here is
where OTR departs away from the traditional DH in a more radical manner. Bob
then generates two keys using AES, lets say c and c’. He also calculates 4 Message
Authentication Code (MAC) keys m1, m1’, m2, m2’. Picks a serial number keyidB
for his public key gx. He then computes
MB = MACm1(g
x, gy, pubB, keyidB) and XB = pubB, keyidB, sigB(MB) and
sends r, AESc(XB),MACm2(AESc(XB)) to Alice.
The MB value is a function of Bob’s public key (which is global), has a serial ID
for the session.
4. Alice uses r to decrypt the AESr(gx) sent in step 1 and obtain gx. Then she runs
the HASH function on gx to determine its integrity using the hash value from step
1. She then computes her s = (gx)y. Using the exact same algorithm as Bob, she
computes two keys using AES, c and c’ and 4 MAC keys m1, m1’, m2, m2’. Using
the values c and m2 she can decipher the AES and match hashes to extract and
verify the data sent by Bob in step 3. This would in the end provide Alice with the
pubB, keyidB, sigB(MB). Now Alice has the secret key, the public key, the serial id
and uses the signature proof of a successful key exchange by verifying sigB(MB)
with pubB.
Alice must then generate AESc′(XA),MAC ′m2(AESc′(XA)) to be sent to Bob so
that he can verify the keys provided by Alice.
5. Bob uses m2’ to verify MACm2′(AESc′(XA)) and c’ to decrypt AESc′(XA) to
obtain XA = pubA, keyidA, sigA(MA) and can verify sigA(MA) with pubA.
Both Alice and Bob used the keyIdA and keyIdB parameters. These parameters indeed
separate OTR from other key exchange implementations. When Alice is calculating secret
keys using bob’s recent key and her own key, she also chooses her next key and passes
it with the encrypted message that Alice sends to Bob. The message also contains a new
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serial id for the new key. Bob deciphers the received message, finds the new key within
and sends an acknowledgement to Alice. In the next message Alice can use her new key
to encrypt the message and the older keys can be discarded. Hence, the system has con-
stantly changing cryptographic keys which are short lived and are termed as ephemeral
keys. Serial id’s also help in distinguishing different clients used by same users.
The dependence of OTR on synchronous messaging systems poses problems with SM-
S/MMS systems where conversations last longer, unlike IM. Even in case of IM, Alice’s
keys are updated only when Bob acknowledges message reception. If Bob fails to reply
to messages by Alice, her key would be valid till he does reply. It also provides for a
very poor user experience in systems like iOS, where messaging applications have access
to messaging system only once the user has read the message. This prevents systems
from leveraging the ephemeral key exchange of OTR with some messeging applications
falling back to PGP and S/MIME to handle asynchronous messaging [31] and all together
abandoning forward secrecy.
5.1.3 SCIMP Ratchet
Silent Circle Instant Messaging Protocol (SCIMP) [32] was developed by Simple Circle
group for their Silent Text IM application. It is a synchronous IM protocol where the keys
are changed with every message based on predefined hash function. This provides perfect
forward secrecy. A high level explanation of the steps involved is provided below.
1. Alice and Bob set of a secure channel using the first set of DH keys.
2. Alice sends the first message by encrypting it using her first DH-1 key. Bob decrypts
the message and responds with a message and an acknowledgement.
3. Alice and Bob generate next set of DH keys by hashing their previous secret key.
Both of them use the same hashing scheme.
4. Alice or Bob can now send an encrypted message using the DH-2 key.
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According to Textsecure developers, this scheme has following drawbacks.
1. When messages are out of sequence (which can be common in SMS/MMS and rare
in IM), users cannot discard their older hash keys. Schemes of determining life time
of unused old hash keys would be problematic.
2. SCIMP provides optimal forward secrecy, however compromise of anyone of the
older hash keys could compromise the system as the hash function generating next
key is known. Hence it fails to provide future secrecy.
5.1.4 The TextSecure Way
TextSecure finds a middle ground to the above cryptographic schemes. It tries to achieve
optimal forward secrecy of SCIMP and future secrecy of OTR with as little negatives as
possible [33]. The innovative new method used in TextSecure is credited to Trevor Perrin.
Problems and proposed solutions from both the above techniques are illustrated below.
1. The parameters used in OTR prevents man in the middle attacks as each message
contains next key id’s, thus allowing for traceability and detection of tampered mes-
sages. This however increase book keeping and also adds additional steps to key
exchange which the authors of TextSecure wanted to minimize. They wanted to re-
duce this by eliminating the ”advertise” step (where the message also contains the
next key) of OTR. To reduce this step, TextSecure derives a RootKey in the initial
handshake. This is then re-derived from every subsequent DH handshake. This
would eliminate the ”advertise” phase. Alice can then send a message to Bob by
generating a key derived from root key without waiting for Bob to acknowledge the
key.
2. The immediate forward secrecy of SCIMP can be mixed into the above method by
providing hash iteration within each DH ratchet click. What this means is that for
a given DH key pair, any messages sent before either Alice or Bob moves to the
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next Rootkey, the messages would be encrypted with a key that is a derivative of
the RootKey and SCIMP hash iteration.
3. The application also uses Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) (where the gener-
ator class is an elliptic curve on a Cartesian system).
4. Figure 5.1, better explains the ephemeral key generation in the new TextSecure mes-
saging model. From Alice’s perspective, the key pairs that she processes for each
ECDH exchange is represented as ECDH (An, Bn) where An is Alice’s RootKey
on a particular ECDH ratchet (instance) and Bn is Bob’s key. n represents the nth
RootKey generated by either Alice or Bob. The branches with node of the form
CK-An-Bn represent the sub ratchet and it comes up in cases where a party has
sent more than one message before response from the other. For example under the
node CK-A1-B0, Alice sent 3 messages and the keys used for these message are
shown as MK-0,1,2. These sub-chain keys are hash iterated with the first key MK-0
derived from the RootKey ECDH (A1-B0). Thus, the new implementation ensures
that Alice can generate ephemeral keys and that these keys can still be traced back
to the RootKey (prevent MITM attacks) while providing the freedom to send future
secure messages.
5.2 ChatSecure and Orbot
Chat Secure is an open source OTR encryption application which enables messaging over
XMPP protocol.
• It supports XMPP with TLS certificate pinning.
• It operates on OTR.
• It makes use of The Onion Router (TOR) network.
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Figure 5.1: Key Generation from Alice’s perspective
• It provides encryption of application data through SqlCipher [34].
The most interesting feature in the application is the use of The Onion Router (TOR) to
route traffic anonymously. Access to the Tor network is available through its own browser
(a modified version of Firefox that integrates well with the tor client). On Android, the
Tor project has been ported as Orbot. The Tor project consists of volunteer across the
Internet that maintain a network of systems called tor-relays which communicate with
each other using Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunneling. When a user uses Orbot or
any other Tor client, they get access to this virtual network. As the information is passed
between the devices and the Tor relays, data is encrypted in the application layer along
with the source and destination. The Tor relays, further randomly select peers to create
a virtual circuit with each relay adding its own layer of encryption. This provides for a
secure and anonymous network which can be used to gain privacy on the Internet.
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The use of Orbot, along with the OTR encryption technology provides for a very secure
application. According to the EFF secure messaging scorecard, chatsecure with orbot
passes all the important security questions. ChatSecure however does not support SM-
S/MMS. In fact many Messaging application have either dropped or moved away from
SMS/MMS security. The prime reason for this could be that Telephony channels are no
more considered to be secure. With devices readily available [35] in the market which
could act as false telephony base stations and siphon user calls and data, it makes the
telecommunication channels highly unreliable for secrecy. Also with news of Telecom
providers readily siphoning their data to government agencies is disconcerting [36].
Chapter 6
A New Messaging Solution
Trusted applications in cryptography lately, have moved towards open frameworks. Ap-
plications that can be easily audited, whose underlying implementation is in the public
domain are common now. These applications are all supported by EFF and the open
source community. Such applications are open to scrutiny by security experts all over the
world and accept new proposals of improvements accompanied with quick peer reviewed
patches. This is in sharp contrast to close sourced applications where peer reviews on
large scale is not possible and vulnerabilities can go unnoticed for long periods of time.
6.1 Goals
Cryptographic applications however have not yet reached mainstream acceptance. The
most common problem being that cryptographic schemes interfere with user experience.
However, problems with user experience have been demonstrably solved by applications
like TextSecure. The more important problem with cryptographic applications, is the lack
of understanding of their concepts among less technical users. As a result most users shun
away from these applications.
Another factor, which most cryptographers would ignore, as it does not go well with
Kerckhoffs’s principle [37]. Kerckhoffs principle states that ”A cryptosystem should be
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secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge”. The
concept of allowing the system internals be know to public has many advantages. How-
ever, it also has disadvantage of enabling cryptanalyst, with malicious intent, to be able
to reverse engineer solutions.
My proposal is to design an application that meets the following design goals.
1. 1. Provide a messaging application, that allows novice users with the ability to write
their own cryptographic schemes, in an easy, learn-able scripting language.
2. Provide advanced programmers with tools to write complex cryptographic schemes.
The idea being that, as more developers get to play with cryptographic schemes
on messaging applications, it would generate a collection of schemes which could
be open or close sourced based on the discretion of the user. It would creates a
platform with multiple encryption schemes, with the possibility of overwhelming
cryptanalysts trying to break encryption systems.
6.2 Design
Design specification for secure messaging solution can be better explained by dividing it
into smaller components. The following section starts the discussion by explaining the
choice of the application platform. It then presents a discussion on the medium of key
exchange. Thirdly, it discuss the medium of message exchange. This is followed with
a discussion on the choice of a scripting language that the users would need to know to
write their encryption schemes.
6.2.1 Platform
The platform of choice for the application is Android. This choice is dependent on the
following factors.
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1. The Android platform provides better support for messaging application than iOS.
The security implementation on iOS does not give access to custom SMS applica-
tions unless the user has acknowledged the reception of message from the home
screen notification. This would prove a hassle in case of cryptographic schemes
which perform key exchange handshakes. A key exchange in cryptography usually
involves sending at least a couple of messages to and fro, which would hamper user
experience.
2. Android provides great support for NFC technology that has only recently been
introduced on iOS.
3. AndroidSE and its application sandbox are well understood security technologies.
This could assist future development/enhancement if additional security features
were felt necessary.
4. Rooting on Android allows applications to exploit system level features of Linux
which could prove useful for creating custom hash functions.
5. ROM modification communities in Android provide a good platform when testing
experimental applications and can serve as a good community feedback platform.
6.2.2 Medium of Key Exchange
For the application, the default channel for exchanging cryptographic schemes and keys
is NFC. NFC allows information to be exchanged in very close proximity. The device has
to be in constant contact for data transfer. This eliminates any kind of Man in the middle
(MIMT) attack. One could argue that QR codes would be a better (and more common,
similar to TextSecure), but possibilities presented by NFC seemed interesting. Also, QR
codes can be copied by taking a picture of the QR code from another phone, where as the
same thing cannot be done to NFC tags.
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6.2.3 Medium of Data Exchange
Initially, the idea was to develop a solution for SMS messaging, and in fact the proof-
of-concept application uses SMS as the Medium of data exchange. But during the case
study of Messaging applications, it was concluded that the final application must support
Instant Messaging (IM). The user would be provided with the option to send message
over IM or SMS. In case of IM, it was decided that Google Cloud Messaging would be
the first supported platform and later expansion to other messaging platforms would be
done based on user demands.
When sending data over certain mediums, one must keep in mind the character encoding
supported on the medium. For example, SMS on GSM networks follows the GSM 03.38,
where the default encoding uses 7 bit alphabets, which limits SMS messages to 160 char-
acters. When using an encoding of 8-bit, the maximum character limit per message falls
down to 140 characters. The encoding also effects the recognizable characters. Wrongly
encoded messages would not be decoded correctly and could break user defined crypto-
graphic schemes.
Similar, design considerations must be taken when sending messages over IM where the
encoding could be either UTF-8, UTF-16 or UTF-32. It would be better to provide users
with the option to select the encoding, but only in cases of advanced users who have better
understanding of encoding schemes. With novice users, the application must take care of
the encoding by itself.
6.2.4 Scripting Language
For the application, I researched the following scripting languages and weighed on their
pros and cons to come up with a suitable choice. Android does not directly support any
scripting languages that can be run from inside the application. The need for this feature
has however been felt by some developers prompting them to try incorporating this feature
into Android.
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1. Scripting Layer for Android (SL4A) : This project is hosted on Git-hub and active
development has stopped on the project. The project’s goals was to add support for
scripting languages Python, Perl, JRuby, Lua, BeanShell, JavaScript, Tcl, and shell.
However as the project was discontinued, I chose to not use this project.
2. Qpyton : It provides a platform to run python code inside Android application. I
however did not choose this, as I was looking for an scripting language closer to
Java.
3. Groovy : I finally chose groovy as the language to support scripting of crypto-
graphic schemes. Groovy seemed interesting, as it can benefit directly from the
cryptographic libraries available on Android platform. Groovy was originally de-
veloped to provide better scripting on Java and today has branched into its own
language that can be compiled to run on Oralce JVM.
Choosing groovy, however posed a problem. Groovy code does not compile to ART
VM. Compiled groovy scripts generate byte code that is compatible with Oracel JVM or
OpenJDK VM. This meant that the groovy code the users would write had to be ported to
ART VM compatible byte code. Searching solutions for the problem, led to a solution by
Cedric Champeau [38], who has been working on a project which would enable Android
application development in groovy. His project grooidshell-example on Git-hub contained
the key features which I needed to transform the groovy scripts written by users into ART
VM compatible code. The procedure is documented in the code added in this thesis’s
appendix.
6.2.5 Contact Management
In the proposed application, the user can either write their own cryptographic scheme, or
they could be utilizing a scheme that has been shared with them by a contact. This creates
a situation where a user would have different schemes available for different contacts.
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This called for better management of schemes.
Having a scheme stored for every contact on the user’s phone is not ideal. Instead, the
application would maintain a separate database table for schemes to handle redundancy.
Each scheme is identified by an id. The application would have a second table of contacts,
with a column for scheme id. When a new scheme is available, either through user’s input
in ”Algorithm Code” or from being shared through another user, the scheme would be
checked with available schemes in the database. If the new scheme matches an already
existing scheme, no new entries would be made in the scheme table, instead the scheme id
of the existing scheme would be added to the contact table for the corresponding contact.
This would save space and eliminate data redundancy.
The check for scheme match could be done either by doing a direct string compare, or
by maintaining message digest hash of the available schemes with the hash of the newly
available scheme.
6.2.6 Data Encryption
The tables in the database would be encrypted. One can use readily available libraries
like SqlCrypt. Further encryption could be provided by prompting user to enable device
encryption on the Android device. This would add to the application’s and user’s data
security.
6.2.7 Orbot
Applications that want to use Tor on Android must also install Orbot. The Netcipher
project available under ’guardianproject/NetCipher’ on Git-hub, provides libraries that
can be included into an Android project. Android applications can then access the Orbot
services hosted by the Orbot applications using the proxies libraries available in Netci-
pher project and connecting over HTTP Proxy localhost 8118 SOCKS 45 Proxy local-
host 9050. NetCipher also provides libraries that can be used to prompt the user to install
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Orbot if the Orbot service is missing on the Android system.
Chapter 7
Proof Of Concept
The proof of concept application, is named as CryptoNoob, tries to check the viability of
the following solutions.
1. Viability of NFC in cryptographic scheme and key exchange.
2. Viability of allowing user defined cryptographic schemes.
7.1 Walkthrough
The application follows the recommended Drawer Pattern designed by Google for An-
droid. If you are familiar with the Gmail Application on Android KitKat, it is the pop out
drawer on the left with options that the users can choose, with each option providing the
user with a new view of the application. CryptoNoob application implements a similar
drawer with the following four options.
1. Groovy Scripts : The Groovy Script navigation drawer is the part of the applica-
tion where a user can enter their custom cryptographic schemes and test them. It contains
a text box titled ”Algorithm Code” where a user can enter the algorithm code. Algorithm
code must be written in Groovy language. It must implement two functions/methods
called encryptTest and decryptTest. Both the methods take one String parameter as input.
By default the application comes with a simple Ceaser Shift Cipher, that the users can
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use an example. The second text area names ”Test String” is where a user can enter some
test string and check the validity of their cryptographic scheme by pressing the ”Save
and Run Test” button. When this button is pressed, the application takes the text from
the ”Test String” text area and passes it as an input parameter to the encryptTest method
defined in cryptographic scheme. The output of encryptTest method is then passed a s
a parameter to the decryptTest method. If the text in ”Test String” is same as the output
of the decryptTest method, the application assumes that the messages are encrypting and
decrypting fine. The cipher text of the message/string in ”Test String” message box is
copied to clipboard and the encryption scheme (the groovy script in ”Algorithm Code”
is saved to the database.). The user can now open the SMS application of his choice on
the device, paste the cipher text from Android clipboard and be able to send an encrypted
message.
Figure 7.1: Application View : Groovy Scripts
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2. NFC Initiate : NFC Initiate contains a ”NFC Initiate” button. On pressing the but-
ton, the application creates a NFC tag containing the cryptographic algorithm stored and
tested in Groovy Scripts→ Algorithm Code. Once the NFC Initiate button is pressed, the
device can be brought in contact with any NFC enabled Android device with CryptoNoob
installed on it and the message stored in NFC Initiator device will be transferred to the
NFC Receiver device.
Figure 7.2: Application View : NFC Initiate
3. NFC Respond : A drawer, designed to confirm that the application has in-fact re-
ceived a new cryptographic scheme from the NFC initiator. Once the NFC receiver device
detects the NFC tags sent from a CryptoNoob application, it prompts the user to accept or
decline the NFC tag. If the NFC tag is accepted, the new scheme is saved into the receiver
devices’ database.
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4. Messages : When Android devices with CrytoNoob installed on them, receive an
encrypted message, CryptoNoob recognizes the message and displays a notification in the
Android notification bar saying that a new encrypted message has been received. The user
can view all their past messages decrypted in this navigation drawer by either navigating
to it from the CryptoNoob application or by taping the notification item in the notification
bar.
Figure 7.3: Application View : NFC Respond
7.2 Observations
With the application, I was able to prove that scripting language can be embedded into
the Android application, and that they are capable of performing encryption and decryp-
tion of data. The application also proved the ability of NFC to act as a good medium for
exchange of keys and cryptographic schemes.
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There is one concern with the application. The performance of the application is not very
impressive. The process of recompiling Groovy script to JVM code, then to ART VM
compatible code causes noticeable lag in the application. Right now the application com-
piles the Groovy script on every incoming message. This is not ideal. One immediate
solution would be cache the compiled dex files into the applications data directory and
associate each dex file with its Groovy code. This would help eliminate the problem of
recompiling scripts for every request. For improvements on the compilation process itself
would require a deeper study of the ART VM byte code.
Another, more radical method of improving performance could be through the use of
rooted Android ROM. Where one could install scripting languages onto the Linux kernel
(probably python). Then all user scripts can be run natively, improving performance. This
would effect the usability of the application which is counter objective to making a user
friendly applications for novice users.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
The bulk of the work in this thesis was directed towards attaining implementation level
knowledge of the initial problem and it’s proposed solution. As a result, the thesis covered
the Android architecture and NFC in great lengths. To develop a messaging application,
it was very important to understand existing secure messaging applications. Considerable
time was hence spent on TextSecure and ChatSecure. The thesis examined the basics
of Android Security architecture and in the process SELinux. It discussed some practical
cryptographic systems which are being used today by numerous applications. Availability
of resources regarding these topics in public domain proved very helpful in understanding
the various cryptographic systems.
The goal of the thesis was to provide a solution that has the possibility to provide a plat-
form for people to share and understand different cryptographic schemes. To achieve this,
the thesis proposed an application that was easy to use and provided basic security for
messaging through cryptographic schemes implemented by users.
The thesis, was able to prove key concepts that would be helpful in refining the solution
further in the future. It was able to prove with a working example that, one can have user
scripts run successfully on Android platform. That these user scripts have the possibility
of using both the Android libraries and Linux system libraries to enable users in creating
cryptographic schemes. It was able to successfully demonstrate that one can share cryp-
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tographic schemes over the NFC medium.
The thesis recognizes that there are certain areas that would need work in the future,
specifically the performance overhead that comes with running scripts that do not have
any kind of support on the Android platform.
Future goals of this project would be following.
1. Set up a web portal where user’s can share/discuss new cryptographic schemes.
2. Set up a web application where user’s can test new schemes before moving them to
their devices.
3. Find better methods to improve the present performance issues that have been dis-
cussed under section 7.2.
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Appendix A
Building and Installing the Application
The source of the application can be found at the Git-hub location
https://github.com/flyingarg/CryptoNoob
The code available on GitHub contains Android Java files and build file. The target apk
can be built using the following steps. 1. Install git, Oracle JDK 7 and gradle version 2.4
or above.
2. Clone the project using the following command.
git clone https://github.com/flyingarg/CryptoNoob.git
3. Enter the cloned directory and build it using ”gradle assemble”
cd CryptoNoob
gradle assemble
4. Once the build completes, the application can be found in the location.
APPENDIX A. BUILDING AND INSTALLING THE APPLICATION A-2
cd CryptoNoob/app/build/outputs/apk
5. The ”app-debug.apk” can be copied to a Android device with minimum version 4.2.2
and installed by clicking app-debug.apk through a file manager.
Appendix B
Source Code
public class MainActivity extends BaseActivity{
private String tempStoreAlgo = "";
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setTitle(R.string.app_name);
setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
mTitle = getTitle();
navigationDrawerFragment = new NavigationDrawerFragment();
Bundle argsNDF = new Bundle();
argsNDF.putInt("position", 0);
navigationDrawerFragment.setArguments(getIntent().getExtras());
navigationDrawerFragment.setArguments(argsNDF);
getSupportFragmentManager().beginTransaction().add(R.id.fragment_container,
navigationDrawerFragment).addToBackStack(null).commit();
}
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public void onNavigationDrawerItemSelected(int position) {
Log.i("rajumoh", "MainActivity position : " + position);
super.onNavigationDrawerItemSelected(position);
}
@Override
public View createRootView(LayoutInflater inflater,
ViewGroup container, Bundle savedInstanceState) {
final View rootView =
inflater.inflate(R.layout.fragment_1, container,
false);
EditText algoSave =
(EditText)rootView.findViewById(R.id.algo_save);
EditText testTextSave =
(EditText)rootView.findViewById(R.id.test_text_save);
tempStoreAlgo = DatabaseUtils.getAlgoFromDb(null,
getApplicationContext());
algoSave.setText(tempStoreAlgo);
testTextSave.setText("Test plain text");
Button runTest =
(Button)rootView.findViewById(R.id.run_test);
runTest.setOnClickListener(new View.OnClickListener() {
@Override
public void onClick(View view) {
EditText algoSave = (EditText)
rootView.findViewById(R.id.algo_save);
EditText testTextSave = (EditText)
rootView.findViewById(R.id.test_text_save);
String encryptTest = "encryptTest(testString);\n";
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String encDecTest =
"decryptTest(encryptTest(testString));\n";
GrooidShell shell = new
GrooidShell(getApplicationContext().getDir("dynclasses",
0), this.getClass().getClassLoader());
///Log.i("rajumoh", "Evaluating EncryptionTest : " +
shell.evaluate(algoSave.getText() + "\ntestString
= \"" + testTextSave.getText() + "\"\n" +
encryptTest).getResult());
//Log.i("rajumoh", "Evaluating EncDecTest : " +
shell.evaluate(algoSave.getText()+"\ntestString =
\""+testTextSave.getText()+"\"\n"+encDecTest).getResult());
String response = shell.evaluate(algoSave.getText()
+ "\ntestString = \"" + testTextSave.getText() +
"\"\n" + encDecTest).getResult();
if
(response.equals(testTextSave.getText().toString()))
{
ClipboardManager clipboard = (ClipboardManager)
getSystemService(CLIPBOARD_SERVICE);
ClipData clip = ClipData.newPlainText("message",
"$$" + shell.evaluate(algoSave.getText() +
"\ntestString = \"" + testTextSave.getText() +
"\"\n" + encryptTest).getResult());
clipboard.setPrimaryClip(clip);
Toast.makeText(getApplicationContext(), "Test
Success.Message copied to clipboard",
Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show();
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} else {
Toast.makeText(getApplicationContext(), "Test
Failed. Your Crypt does not seem to be working",
Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show();
}
if
(!tempStoreAlgo.equals(algoSave.getText().toString()))
{
Log.i("rajumoh", "There was some change in the
algo, saving new algo");
if (DatabaseUtils.updateAlgoToDb(null,
algoSave.getText().toString(),
getApplicationContext()))
Log.i("rajumoh", "Algo Successfully saved");
else
Log.e("rajumoh", "Failed to save the algo to
database.");
}
}
});
return rootView;
}
}
public abstract class BaseActivity extends ActionBarActivity
implements
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NavigationDrawerFragment.NavigationDrawerCallbacks {
//protected NavigationDrawerFragment
mNavigationDrawerFragment;
protected NavigationDrawerFragment navigationDrawerFragment;
protected CharSequence mTitle;
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
}
@Override
public void onNavigationDrawerItemSelected(int position) {
Intent intent;
if (position == 0 && !(this instanceof MainActivity)) {
Log.i("rajumoh", "Switching to MainActivity");
intent = new Intent(this, MainActivity.class);
this.startActivity(intent);
} else if (position == 1 && !(this instanceof
ActivityTwo)){
Log.i("rajumoh", "Switching to ActivityTwo");
intent = new Intent(this, ActivityTwo.class);
this.startActivity(intent);
} else if(position == 2 && !(this instanceof
ActivityThree)){
Log.i("rajumoh", "Switching to ActivityThree");
intent = new Intent(this, ActivityThree.class);
this.startActivity(intent);
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}else if(position == 3 && !(this instanceof
ActivityFour)){
Log.i("rajumoh", "Switching to ActivityFour");
intent = new Intent(this, ActivityFour.class);
this.startActivity(intent);
}else {
Log.i("rajumoh", "Commit Fragment to position : " +
position);
FragmentManager fragmentManager =
getSupportFragmentManager();
fragmentManager.beginTransaction()
.replace(R.id.container,
PlaceholderFragment.newInstance(position + 1,
this))
.commit();
}
}
public static class PlaceholderFragment extends Fragment {
private static final String ARG_SECTION_NUMBER =
"section_number";
private static BaseActivity baseActivity;
public static PlaceholderFragment newInstance(int
sectionNumber, BaseActivity activity) {
PlaceholderFragment fragment = new PlaceholderFragment();
Bundle args = new Bundle();
args.putInt(ARG_SECTION_NUMBER, sectionNumber);
fragment.setArguments(args);
baseActivity = activity;
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return fragment;
}
public PlaceholderFragment() {
}
@Override
public View onCreateView(LayoutInflater inflater,
ViewGroup container, Bundle savedInstanceState) {
int section =
this.getArguments().getInt(ARG_SECTION_NUMBER);
if ( section == 1){
return baseActivity.createRootView(inflater,
container,
savedInstanceState);//inflater.inflate(R.layout.fragment_1,
container, false);
}else if( section == 2){
return baseActivity.createRootView(inflater,
container,
savedInstanceState);/*inflater.inflate(R.layout.fragment_2,
container, false);*/
}else if( section == 3){
return baseActivity.createRootView(inflater,
container,
savedInstanceState);/*inflater.inflate(R.layout.fragment_2,
container, false);*/
}else {
return baseActivity.createRootView(inflater,
container,
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savedInstanceState);/*inflater.inflate(R.layout.fragment_3,
container, false);*/
}
}
@Override
public void onAttach(Activity activity) {
super.onAttach(activity);
((BaseActivity)
activity).onSectionAttached(getArguments().getInt(ARG_SECTION_NUMBER));
}
}
@Override
public boolean onOptionsItemSelected(MenuItem item) {
int id = item.getItemId();
if (id == R.id.action_settings) {
return true;
}
return super.onOptionsItemSelected(item);
}
public void onSectionAttached(int number) {
switch (number) {
case 1:
mTitle = getString(R.string.title_section1);
break;
case 2:
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mTitle = getString(R.string.title_section2);
break;
case 3:
mTitle = getString(R.string.title_section3);
break;
case 4:
mTitle = getString(R.string.title_section4);
break;
}
}
public void restoreActionBar() {
ActionBar actionBar = getSupportActionBar();
actionBar.setNavigationMode(ActionBar.NAVIGATION_MODE_STANDARD);
actionBar.setDisplayShowTitleEnabled(true);
actionBar.setTitle(mTitle);
}
@Override
public boolean onCreateOptionsMenu(Menu menu) {
//if (!mNavigationDrawerFragment.isDrawerOpen()) {
if (!navigationDrawerFragment.isDrawerOpen()) {
getMenuInflater().inflate(R.menu.main, menu);
restoreActionBar();
return true;
}
return super.onCreateOptionsMenu(menu);
}
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public abstract View createRootView(LayoutInflater
inflater, ViewGroup container, Bundle
savedInstanceState);
}
public class ActivityTwo extends BaseActivity {
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setTitle(R.string.app_name);
setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
mTitle = getTitle();
navigationDrawerFragment = new NavigationDrawerFragment();
Bundle argsNDF = new Bundle();
argsNDF.putInt("position", 1);
navigationDrawerFragment.setArguments(getIntent().getExtras());
navigationDrawerFragment.setArguments(argsNDF);
getSupportFragmentManager().beginTransaction().replace(R.id.fragment_container,
navigationDrawerFragment).addToBackStack(null).commit();
}
public void onNavigationDrawerItemSelected(int position) {
Log.i("rajumoh", "ActivityTwo position : " + position);
super.onNavigationDrawerItemSelected(position);
}
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@Override
public View createRootView(LayoutInflater inflater,
ViewGroup container, Bundle savedInstanceState) {
View rootView =
(View)inflater.inflate(R.layout.fragment_2, container,
false);
TextView temp =
(TextView)rootView.findViewById(R.id.section_label);
temp.setText("Fragment Two");
Button button =
(Button)rootView.findViewById(R.id.nfc_init);
button.setOnClickListener(new View.OnClickListener() {
@Override
public void onClick(View view) {
byte[] data = "253".getBytes();
byte[] algoData = DatabaseUtils.getAlgoFromDb(null,
getApplicationContext()).getBytes();
NdefRecord keyRecord =
NdefRecord.createExternal("com.rajumoh.cryptnoob",
"externaltype", data);
NdefRecord algoRecord =
NdefRecord.createMime("text/plain", algoData);
NdefMessage message = new NdefMessage(new
NdefRecord[]{keyRecord, algoRecord});
NfcAdapter.getDefaultAdapter(getApplicationContext()).setNdefPushMessage(message,
ActivityTwo.this);
Log.i("rajumoh", "Active to send NdefMessage......");
Toast.makeText(getApplicationContext(), "Well It now
seems to be ready send message",
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Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show();
}
});
return rootView;
}
@Override
public void onNewIntent(Intent intent) {
Log.i("rajumoh", "Intent invoked");
Log.i("rajumoh", "" +
NfcAdapter.ACTION_NDEF_DISCOVERED.equals(getIntent().getAction()));
setIntent(intent);
}
}
public class ActivityThree extends BaseActivity {
public static String algo = "";
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setTitle(R.string.app_name);
setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
mTitle = getTitle();
navigationDrawerFragment = new NavigationDrawerFragment();
Bundle argsNDF = new Bundle();
argsNDF.putInt("position", 2);
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navigationDrawerFragment.setArguments(getIntent().getExtras());
navigationDrawerFragment.setArguments(argsNDF);
getSupportFragmentManager().beginTransaction().replace(R.id.fragment_container,
navigationDrawerFragment).addToBackStack(null).commit();
}
public void onNavigationDrawerItemSelected(int position) {
Log.i("rajumoh", "ActivityThree position : " + position);
super.onNavigationDrawerItemSelected(position);
}
public void onResume() {
Log.i("rajumoh", "onResume");
super.onResume();
if
(NfcAdapter.ACTION_NDEF_DISCOVERED.equals(getIntent().getAction()))
{
Parcelable[] rawMsgs =
getIntent().getParcelableArrayExtra(NfcAdapter.EXTRA_NDEF_MESSAGES);
if (rawMsgs != null) {
NdefMessage[] msgs = new NdefMessage[rawMsgs.length];
for (int i = 0; i < rawMsgs.length; i++) {
msgs[i] = (NdefMessage) rawMsgs[i];
NdefRecord[] records = msgs[i].getRecords();
for(NdefRecord record : records){
String recordId = new String(record.getId());
String payload = new String(record.getPayload());
Log.i("rajumoh", "Records id : " + recordId);
Log.i("rajumoh", "Record payload : " + payload);
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if(payload.contains("encryptTest"))
algo = payload;
}
}
}
Log.i("rajumoh", "Extracted the payload : " + algo);
AlertDialog.Builder alertDialogBuilder = new
AlertDialog.Builder(this);
alertDialogBuilder.setTitle("Algorithm Save
Confirmation");
alertDialogBuilder
.setMessage("Click yes to save the Algorithm, No to
Ignore")
.setCancelable(false)
.setPositiveButton("Yes",new
DialogInterface.OnClickListener() {
public void onClick(DialogInterface dialog,int id)
{
ActivityThree.saveAlgoToDb(getApplicationContext());
ActivityThree.this.finish();
}
})
.setNegativeButton("No", new
DialogInterface.OnClickListener() {
public void onClick(DialogInterface dialog, int id) {
dialog.cancel();
}
});
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AlertDialog alertDialog = alertDialogBuilder.create();
alertDialog.show();
}
}
@Override
public void onNewIntent(Intent intent) {
Log.i("rajumoh", "Intent invoked");
Log.i("rajumoh",""+NfcAdapter.ACTION_NDEF_DISCOVERED.equals(getIntent().getAction()));
setIntent(intent);
}
@Override
public View createRootView(LayoutInflater inflater,
ViewGroup container, Bundle savedInstanceState) {
View rootView = inflater.inflate(R.layout.fragment_3,
container, false);
TextView temp =
(TextView)rootView.findViewById(R.id.section_label);
temp.setText("Fragment Three");
return rootView;
}
public static void saveAlgoToDb(Context context){
Log.i("rajumoh", "Saving NFC received algo to database : "
+ algo);
DatabaseUtils.updateAlgoToDb(null, algo, context);
}
}
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public class ActivityFour extends BaseActivity{
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setTitle(R.string.app_name);
setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
mTitle = getTitle();
navigationDrawerFragment = new NavigationDrawerFragment();
Bundle argsNDF = new Bundle();
argsNDF.putInt("position", 3);
navigationDrawerFragment.setArguments(getIntent().getExtras());
navigationDrawerFragment.setArguments(argsNDF);
getSupportFragmentManager().beginTransaction().replace(R.id.fragment_container,
navigationDrawerFragment).addToBackStack(null).commit();
}
public void onNavigationDrawerItemSelected(int position) {
Log.i("rajumoh", "ActivityFour position : " + position);
super.onNavigationDrawerItemSelected(position);
}
//TODO : Might have conflict with when invoked by user
select.. may be !!
@Override
public View createRootView(LayoutInflater inflater,
ViewGroup container, Bundle savedInstanceState) {
Cursor cursor =
DatabaseUtils.getMessages(getApplicationContext());
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if(cursor==null || cursor.getCount()==0)
return inflater.inflate(R.layout.fragment_4,
container, false);
CursorAdapter dataAdapter = new
SimpleCursorAdapter(getApplicationContext(),
R.layout.message_field,
cursor,
new String[]{SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_CONTACT,
SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_CONTENT},
new int[]{R.id.message_contact,
R.id.message_content},
0);
View rootView = inflater.inflate(R.layout.fragment_4,
container, false);
ListView temp =
(ListView)rootView.findViewById(R.id.list_messages);
temp.setAdapter(dataAdapter);
return rootView;
}
}
Gets Activated When SMS is received. On reception on SMS, this
code verifies if the SMS is encrypted and then decrypts it
and stored it.
public class SmsReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
@Override
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
Log.i("rajumoh", "Got a SMS Message");
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SmsMessage msgs[] = getMessagesFromIntent(intent);
String message_contact = "";
String message_content = "";
if (msgs != null) {
for (SmsMessage msg : msgs) {
message_contact = msg.getOriginatingAddress();
message_content += msg.getMessageBody();
}
}
Log.i("rajumoh","Message received : ’" + message_content
+ "’");
if(message_content.startsWith("$$")){
String message = message_content.substring(2);
Log.i("rajumoh", "Message : ’" + message +"’ selected
for decryption");
String decryptMethod = "decryptTest(testString);\n";
GrooidShell shell = new
GrooidShell(context.getDir("dynclasses", 0),
this.getClass().getClassLoader());
String algo = DatabaseUtils.getAlgoFromDb(null,
context);
String decryptedText = shell.evaluate(algo
+"\ntestString = \""+ message
+"\"\n"+decryptMethod).getResult();
Log.i("rajumoh", "Decrypted message : ’" +
decryptedText + "’. Saving to Database");
DatabaseUtils.saveMessage(context, message_contact,
decryptedText);
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Log.i("rajumoh", "Creating and sending notification");
Intent toIntent = new Intent(context,
ActivityFour.class);
NotificationCompat.Builder mBuilder = new
NotificationCompat.Builder(context);
mBuilder.setContentTitle("New Encrypted Message");
mBuilder.setContentText(decryptedText);
mBuilder.setSmallIcon(R.drawable.ic_notification);
TaskStackBuilder stackBuilder =
TaskStackBuilder.create(context);
stackBuilder.addParentStack(ActivityFour.class);
stackBuilder.addNextIntent(toIntent);
PendingIntent pendingIntent =
stackBuilder.getPendingIntent(0,PendingIntent.FLAG_UPDATE_CURRENT);
mBuilder.setContentIntent(pendingIntent);
NotificationManager notificationManager =
(NotificationManager)
context.getSystemService(Context.NOTIFICATION_SERVICE);
notificationManager.notify(0,mBuilder.build());
}
}
public static SmsMessage[] getMessagesFromIntent(Intent
intent) {
Object[] messages = (Object[])
intent.getSerializableExtra("pdus");
byte[][] pduObjs = new byte[messages.length][];
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for (int i = 0; i < messages.length; i++) {
pduObjs[i] = (byte[]) messages[i];
}
byte[][] pdus = new byte[pduObjs.length][];
int pduCount = pdus.length;
SmsMessage[] msgs = new SmsMessage[pduCount];
for (int i = 0; i < pduCount; i++) {
pdus[i] = pduObjs[i];
msgs[i] = SmsMessage.createFromPdu(pdus[i]);
}
return msgs;
}
}
The Following files are related to databases.
public class DatabaseUtils {
public static synchronized boolean isEntryAvailable(String
userName, Context context){
SqlDbHelper dbHelper = new SqlDbHelper(context);
SQLiteDatabase db = dbHelper.getReadableDatabase();
if(userName == null)
userName = "all";
try/*(
Cursor cursor = db.rawQuery("select * from " +
SqlStore.AlgoStore.TABLE_NAME, new String[0])
)*/{
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Cursor cursor = db.rawQuery("select * from " +
SqlStore.AlgoStore.TABLE_NAME + " where " +
SqlStore.AlgoStore.CONTACT_NAME + " = ’" + userName
+ "’", new String[0]);
if(cursor.getCount() == 0) {
Log.i("rajumoh", "No entry in database");
db.close();
return false;
}else {
Log.i("rajumoh","Entry present in database");
db.close();
return true;
}
}catch (SQLException e){
Log.e("rajumoh", e.getMessage());
db.close();
return false;
}
}
public static synchronized String getAlgoFromDb(String
userName, Context context){
String returnString = "";
if(userName==null)
userName="all";
SqlDbHelper dbHelper = new SqlDbHelper(context);
SQLiteDatabase db = dbHelper.getReadableDatabase();
try/*(
Cursor cursor = db.query(SqlStore.AlgoStore.TABLE_NAME,
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null, SqlStore.AlgoStore.CONTACT_NAME + "=’" +
userName + "’", null, null, null, null, null);)*/ {
Cursor cursor =
db.query(SqlStore.AlgoStore.TABLE_NAME, null,
SqlStore.AlgoStore.CONTACT_NAME + "=’" + userName +
"’", null, null, null, null, null);
if (cursor != null) {
if (cursor.getCount() != 1) {
Log.e("rajumoh", "cursor returned n rows : " +
cursor.getCount());
returnString = "";
} else {
Log.i("rajumoh", "cursor returned one row as
expected");
cursor.moveToFirst();
returnString = cursor.getString(2);
}
}
}catch(SQLException e){
db.close();
Log.e("rajumoh", e.getMessage());
}
db.close();
return returnString;
}
public static synchronized boolean insertAlgoToDb(String
userName, String data, Context context){
if(userName==null)
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userName="all";
SqlDbHelper dbHelper = new SqlDbHelper(context);
SQLiteDatabase db = dbHelper.getReadableDatabase();
ContentValues contentValues = new ContentValues();
contentValues.put(SqlStore.AlgoStore.CONTACT_NAME,userName);
contentValues.put(SqlStore.AlgoStore.ALGO, data);
try {
if (!isEntryAvailable(userName, context))
db.insertOrThrow(SqlStore.AlgoStore.TABLE_NAME, null,
contentValues);
else
updateAlgoToDb(userName, data, context);
Log.i("rajumoh","Successfull entry into the database");
}catch(SQLException e){
Log.e("rajumoh", "Could not enter algo to database " +
e.getMessage());
e.printStackTrace();
db.close();
return false;
}
db.close();
return true;
}
public static synchronized boolean updateAlgoToDb(String
userName, String data, Context context){
if(userName==null)
userName="all";
SqlDbHelper dbHelper = new SqlDbHelper(context);
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SQLiteDatabase db = dbHelper.getReadableDatabase();
ContentValues contentValues = new ContentValues();
contentValues.put(SqlStore.AlgoStore.CONTACT_NAME,userName);
contentValues.put(SqlStore.AlgoStore.ALGO, data);
int updatedEntries =
db.updateWithOnConflict(SqlStore.AlgoStore.TABLE_NAME,
contentValues, null, null,
SQLiteDatabase.CONFLICT_REPLACE);
try {
if(updatedEntries == 1) {
Log.i("rajumoh", "Successfull entry into the
database");
db.close();
return true;
}else{
Log.e("rajumoh", "Failed entry into the database,
updated entries : " + updatedEntries);
db.close();
return false;
}
}catch(SQLException e){
Log.e("rajumoh", "Could not enter algo to database " +
e.getMessage());
e.printStackTrace();
db.close();
return false;
}
}
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public static synchronized Cursor getMessages(Context
context){
SqlDbHelper dbHelper = new SqlDbHelper(context);
SQLiteDatabase db = dbHelper.getReadableDatabase();
try/*(
Cursor cursor =
db.query(SqlStore.MessageStore.TABLE_NAME,
new String[]{SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_CONTACT,
SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_CONTENT},//columns
null,//Where clause without the where
null,//Where arguments
null,//group by
null,//having
null,//order by
null);) */{//limit
Cursor cursor =
db.query(SqlStore.MessageStore.TABLE_NAME,
new String[]{SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_ID,
SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_CONTACT,
SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_CONTENT},//columns
null,//Where clause without the where
null,//Where arguments
null,//group by
null,//having
null,//order by
null);
if(cursor.getCount()==0) {
db.close();
return null;
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}else {
db.close();
return cursor;
}
}catch(SQLException e){
Log.e("rajumoh", e.getMessage());
db.close();
return null;
}
}
public static synchronized boolean saveMessage(Context
context, String messageContact, String messageContent){
SqlDbHelper dbHelper = new SqlDbHelper(context);
SQLiteDatabase db = dbHelper.getReadableDatabase();
ContentValues contentValues = new ContentValues();
contentValues.put(SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_CONTACT,messageContact);
contentValues.put(SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_CONTENT,
messageContent);
SimpleDateFormat dateFormat = new
SimpleDateFormat("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss");
String currentTime =
dateFormat.format(Calendar.getInstance().getTime());
contentValues.put(SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_DATE_TIME,currentTime);
try {
db.insertOrThrow(SqlStore.MessageStore.TABLE_NAME, null,
contentValues);
Log.i("rajumoh","Message "+messageContact+" with content
" +messageContent + " stored in database.");
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db.close();
}catch(SQLException e){
Log.e("rajumoh", "Could not enter message to database " +
e.getMessage());
db.close();
e.printStackTrace();
return false;
}
return true;
}
}
public class SqlDbHelper extends SQLiteOpenHelper{
public static final int DATABASE_VERSION = 1;
public static final String DATABASE_NAME = "SqlStore.db";
private static final String CREATE_ALGO_TABLE = "CREATE TABLE
" +
SqlStore.AlgoStore.TABLE_NAME + " ( " +
SqlStore.AlgoStore.ALGO_ID + " INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, " +
SqlStore.AlgoStore.CONTACT_NAME + " TEXT UNIQUE, "+
SqlStore.AlgoStore.ALGO + " TEXT )";
private static final String CREATE_MESSAGE_TABLE = "CREATE
TABLE " +
SqlStore.MessageStore.TABLE_NAME + " ( " +
SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_ID + " INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, "
+
SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_CONTACT + " TEXT , "+
SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_CONTENT + " TEXT, "+
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SqlStore.MessageStore.MESSAGE_DATE_TIME + " DATETIME)";
private static final String DEFAULT_ALGO =
"public encryptTest(plainText){\n" +
" String response = \"\";\n" +
" for(int i=0; i<plainText.length(); i++){\n" +
" tempChar = plainText.charAt(i);\n"+
" if(tempChar<65 || tempChar>122){\n"+
" response+=tempChar;\n"+
" continue;\n" +
"}\n" +
" tempChar = tempChar-65;" +
" response += (char)(((((int)tempChar)+21)%58)+65);" +
" }\n" +
" return response;\n" +
"}\n" +
"\n" +
"public decryptTest(encString){\n" +
" String response = \"\";\n" +
" for(int i=0; i<encString.length(); i++){\n" +
" tempChar = encString.charAt(i);\n" +
" if(tempChar<65 || tempChar>122){\n" +
" response+=tempChar;\n" +
" continue;\n" +
" }\n"+
" tempChar = tempChar-65;\n" +
" response += (char)(((((int)tempChar)+37)%58)+65);\n" +
" }\n" +
" return response;\n" +
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"}\n";
private static final String INSERT_DEFAULT_ALGO = "INSERT
INTO " + SqlStore.AlgoStore.TABLE_NAME + " (" +
SqlStore.AlgoStore.CONTACT_NAME+","+
SqlStore.AlgoStore.ALGO+") values (’all’, ’" +
DEFAULT_ALGO + "’)";
private static final String DROP_ALGO_TABLE = "DROP TABLE IF
EXISTS " + SqlStore.AlgoStore.TABLE_NAME;
private static final String DROP_MESSAGE_TABLE = "DROP TABLE
IF EXISTS " + SqlStore.MessageStore.TABLE_NAME;
public SqlDbHelper(Context context) {
super(context, DATABASE_NAME, null, DATABASE_VERSION);
}
public void onCreate(SQLiteDatabase db) {
db.execSQL(CREATE_ALGO_TABLE);
db.execSQL(CREATE_MESSAGE_TABLE);
db.execSQL(INSERT_DEFAULT_ALGO);
}
public void onUpgrade(SQLiteDatabase db, int oldVersion, int
newVersion) {
db.execSQL(DROP_ALGO_TABLE);
db.execSQL(DROP_MESSAGE_TABLE);
onCreate(db);
}
public void onDowngrade(SQLiteDatabase db, int oldVersion,
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int newVersion) {
onUpgrade(db, oldVersion, newVersion);
}
}
public final class SqlStore {
public SqlStore(){
}
public static abstract class AlgoStore implements BaseColumns{
public static final String TABLE_NAME = "algostore";
public static final String ALGO_ID = "_id";
public static final String CONTACT_NAME = "algo_contact";
public static final String ALGO = "algo";
}
public static abstract class MessageStore implements
BaseColumns{
public static final String TABLE_NAME = "messagestore";
public static final String MESSAGE_ID = "_id";
public static final String MESSAGE_CONTACT =
"message_contact";
public static final String MESSAGE_CONTENT =
"message_content";
public static final String MESSAGE_DATE_TIME =
"message_datetime";
}
